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A PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW
ASAF RAZ*
ABSTRACT
Modern corporate law scholarship focuses on flexible, dynamic ques-
tions: should multiple-class shares be permitted?  To what extent should
staggered boards be implemented?  Even when making the more struc-
tural inquiry—what is a corporation, and what is its purpose?—corporate
jurists tend toward generalizations: perceiving corporate law as either con-
tract law, property law, or public law, and being either shareholderists
(“shareholder primacy” advocates) or stakeholderists (“corporate social re-
sponsibility” advocates).  In these accounts, fiduciary duties presumably
run directly to shareholders or stakeholders.  However, as this Article dem-
onstrates, careful examination of corporate law (in Delaware and many
other jurisdictions) reveals that all of these prevailing conceptions are,
positively and normatively, inaccurate.
This Article offers a new paradigm through which to examine corpo-
rate law.  It provides an integrative theory, fully congruent with both ex-
isting law and policy analysis, showing that corporate law is not any other
field, but has its own structure, with uniquely beneficial economic and
practical implications.  At the heart of corporate law’s anatomy is a simple,
yet profound, fact: the corporation is a person with a purpose.  The corpo-
ration itself has Hohfeldian relationships with its stakeholders, sharehold-
ers, and fiduciaries.  The benefit of both stakeholders and shareholders is
derived from the degree to which the corporation attains its purpose (for
example, the lawful pursuit of profit).  Directors and other fiduciaries, in
turn, have an obligation to cause the corporation to achieve its purpose.
While corporate purpose, personhood, stakeholders, shareholders,
and fiduciaries are all subjects of heated discussion, this Article is the first
to tie them together, providing a fully self-explanatory picture of their mu-
tual interactions.  Doing away with both the “contract/property” and
“shareholder/stakeholder” dichotomies, this Article applies the theory to
several high-currency topics, including shareholder activism, corporations’
constitutional rights, the rise of LLCs and other “alternative” corporations,
mandatory arbitration, and Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act.
At each turn, the purpose-based theory of corporate law produces more
refined conclusions, and charts a way forward—from conceptions devised
in the 1980s, to a nuanced framework, capable of providing better answers
to the many issues corporate law faces in its current state of flux.
* Research Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
asafraz@pennlaw.upenn.edu. I am thankful to Mitch Berman, Danielle D’Onfro,
Jill Fisch, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Larry Hamermesh, Herb Hovenkamp, Amir
Licht, Josephine Sandler Nelson, Gideon Parchomovsky, Elizabeth Pollman, David
Skeel, and participants at the 2019 National Business Law Scholars Conference at
UC Berkeley School of Law. © 2020 Asaf Raz.
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INTRODUCTION
CORPORATE law1 is in an identity crisis.  Its two most fundamentalquestions—“what is a corporation?” and “what is the corporation’s
purpose?”2—are either answered very differently by different commenta-
tors, or (more often) not addressed at all.  In the latter case, judges, law-
yers, and scholars tend to focus on less structural and more modifiable
issues, such as topics in corporate governance (from staggered boards,
through shareholder activism, to dual-class shares), and treat them as if
they are the entirety of corporate law.3  The first two questions operate in
the background, usually unspoken and “taken for granted.”  As a result,
1. In this Article, the terms “corporate law” and “corporation” are used in a
broad sense, corresponding to what is often known as “business associations law”
(an unsatisfactory phrase by itself, since some corporations have a non-business
purpose).  Other terms, such as “organizational law” (tying together both corpora-
tions and non-corporate organizations), are also inadequate.  Corporations in-
clude more than the type of entity known as “corporation” in Delaware and similar
jurisdictions, see Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1
(2020).  Rather, corporations encompass all entities that have the set of character-
istics discussed in this Article. See infra Part I.  These entity types include the
Delaware “corporation,” in addition to the company, cooperative, voluntary asso-
ciation, some partnerships, and others, as far as the range of corporate laws in
a given jurisdiction allows.  They include both for-profit and other-purpose corpo-
rations. See Asaf Raz, Share Law: Toward a New Understanding of Corporate Law,
40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 255, 258 n.1 (2018) (utilizing the same approach).  This is
more than a linguistic issue: it is crucial for this Article’s thesis, recognizing that all
corporations have certain unifying traits, even if they differ in some details (such as
the corporation’s purpose, the title of its governing statute, or its internal govern-
ance rules).  For similar statements, see VISA A.J. KURKI, A THEORY OF LEGAL PER-
SONHOOD 7 (2019) (“I use ‘corporation’ in the British sense, meaning ‘artificial
person’[, not the] American sense of ‘large for-profit company.’”); Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Individual Autonomy in Corporate Law, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 183, 191
(2018) (“The ‘corporation’ . . . may be viewed as a compendium of different forms
of organization, rather than as a single form.  While these different forms com-
prise many overlapping terms and judicial doctrine, each has a core of distinct
terms, supplied both by statute and by the common law.”).  If a reader so wishes, it
is possible to substitute the term “entity” for “corporation” (while noting that, in
the common usage of the word, many things besides corporations are entities).
This Article distinguishes “corporations” in the narrow sense—mainly by referring
to them in quote marks, for example, “Delaware corporation”—from corporations
in the more general sense.
2. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (“[T]he most basic questions [are:] What is a
corporation?  What purpose does it serve?”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate
Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 183 (2013) (“[The law of corporate purpose] is
the most important issue in corporate law, and one of the most important questions
in contemporary social organization.”).
3. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The
Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 806 (1989) (“When people refer to
‘corporate theory,’ they are generally talking about one of three things.  Most
often, they are arguing about corporate governance and corporate behavior.  Less
often, they are raising the more abstract topic of corporate purpose . . . .  Rarely,
however, do they raise the most abstract issue of all: what is a corporation?” (foot-
notes omitted)).
3
Raz: A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
526 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 523
the participants in the corporate law sphere are not speaking the same
language;4 each is “pulling the blanket” in a different direction, generat-
ing fragmented, ineffective discourse.5
Yet, these questions are more than theoretical.  Diverging answers can
lead to massively different outcomes for real-life problems.  In fact, a
proper understanding of corporate law’s structure—the set of phenomena
directly resulting from the concept of a “corporation,”6 and attaching to
every such entity—delineates the boundaries of the debate on each of the
lower-level, dynamic choices.  Interdisciplinary approaches, such as law
and economics or law and society, are useful in determining whether,
when, and how staggered boards or multiple-class shares (among many
other debates) should be implemented.  However, such discourse must
exist within a certain framework, making clear whose welfare we are maxi-
mizing, who are the actors on the playing field, and who owes what kind of
obligations to whom.
Today, the foundations of corporate law appear to be in flux, and not
for the first time.  The current landscape is largely reminiscent of the
1980s, when the “hostile takeover” wave ignited a wide-ranging debate on
the fundamental nature of the corporation and its purpose.7  A well-re-
4. Corporate law suffers from strong divergence even in regard to the words
used by different judges, lawyers, scholars, and other participants.  Consider the
following: “agency costs,” “business judgment rule,” “company” and “corporation,”
“corporate” and “unincorporated,” “corporate governance,” “corporate social re-
sponsibility,” “entrepreneurship,” “equity,” “fiduciary,” “firm,” “internal affairs,”
“nexus of contracts,” “personhood” and “entity,” “private ordering,” “property”
and “investor ownership,” “separation of ownership and control,” “shareholder pri-
macy.”  Which of these terms do you use in your opinions, memoranda, or articles?
In contrast, which appear redundant or unimportant?  Rest assured, some think
that those should be at the center of corporate law discourse.  In fact, they might be
discussing the very same issue, using different phrases.  This miscommunication
comes at an enormous cost to the corporate law community, since each participant
must guess which terms the current audience is familiar with, and risk losing listen-
ers’ comprehension if different expressions are used.  This Article offers a com-
plete structural theory of corporate law, which enables all participants to correctly
handle each of the concepts above (and many others), based on just five building
blocks. See infra Part I.
5. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover
Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1072
(2002) (“[T]he major participants in the debate seem to be talking past each
other. . . .  [T]heir basic conceptions are . . . fundamentally at odds . . . .”).
6. In this regard, corporate law is similar to any other legal area.  For exam-
ple, contract law, at its core, is about the unmodifiable concepts attaching to the
idea of a “contract.”  The contract itself cannot change what a contract is.  On the
distinction between higher-level, “structural” and lower-level, “dynamic” meanings,
see infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
7. The roots of that controversy can be traced to the 1932 debate between
Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (advocating for a stakeholderist
approach); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (defending a more shareholderist approach).  How-
ever, for many following decades, the core questions of corporate theory did not
4
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garded8 article9 by Chancellor William Allen—also one of the most impor-
tant judicial figures of that period—delves into these questions,
concluding there are just two possible answers.  Allen calls them the “prop-
erty” and “entity” conceptions.10  In this Article they are referred to as
shareholderism and stakeholderism, respectively.  Consistent with Allen’s di-
chotomy, modern corporate discourse generally perceives them as the
only options, and most corporate jurists find themselves in one of these
camps.  By and large, shareholderism is associated with the law and eco-
nomics movement,11 while stakeholderism is advocated by those espous-
ing more communitarian views.
According to shareholderists, the corporation is property—specifi-
cally, the property of its shareholders—or, at most, an aggregate (“nexus”)
of contracts, and its purpose is to increase shareholders’ wealth.12  A pre-
sent-day illustration of this approach is the phenomenon of shareholder
activism, particularly by hedge fund managers.13  According to
stakeholderists, the corporation is a person, or entity, separate from its
shareholders; yet, unlike natural persons, the corporation is not free to
lawfully pursue its own benefit—rather, it must promote the open-ended
interests of various stakeholders (such as employees and consumers), be-
yond the rights they already have under non-corporate law.14  A recent
demonstration of this approach is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to
impose a legal duty on corporations to promote “general public bene-
enjoy much salience—which the 1980s takeover wave changed. See Allen, supra
note 2, at 263 (“The 1980s were turbulent years for corporation law.  Twenty years
earlier it had seemed that every interesting question in corporation law had been
completely answered . . . .”); Coates, supra note 3, at 807 (stating, in a 1989 article,
that “arguments over the nature of the corporation died several decades ago,” but
“[t]he legal concept of the corporation is currently in flux”).
8. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 773 (2015) (calling Allen’s arti-
cle “a wonderful essay that all corporate law students should read, [in which]
Chancellor Allen dilated on the two major traditions in American corporate law”).
9. Allen, supra note 2.
10. Id. at 264.
11. This association is not exclusive. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Scott B.
Guernsey & Simone M. Sepe, Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3299889 [https://
perma.cc/SF9Y-66LN] (using empirical economic analysis to argue for stronger
stakeholder orientation); Joel Edan Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf:
Time Culture as Illegal Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31, 61–114 (1996) (using historical,
cultural, and theoretical analysis to argue for stronger shareholder rights).
12. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 264–65, 266–70.
13. See infra Section II.A; see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund Activism,
Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANG-
ING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 156, 156 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall
Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (“Hedge fund activism is to corporate law’s early twenty-
first century what the hostile takeover was to its late twentieth century.”).
14. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 265, 270–72.
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fit.”15  Neither conception ever won over the other;16 shareholder activism
and Senator Warren’s proposal are two examples among many ongoing
debates.  As new battles unfold, the mysteriously repetitive pronounce-
ments of corporate law’s demise17 will continue to turn out flatly mis-
taken.  As Chancellor Allen proclaimed at the previous round,
“[e]verything old became new again.”18
The 1980s left us with two ways of thinking, and they divide the corpo-
rate law community to this day.  It is time to ask: do we really have only
these two to choose from?  Are the underlying motivations of shareholder-
ists and stakeholderists—economic and communitarian, respectively—ac-
tually served by what they say about corporate law?19  As this Article
reveals, corporate law itself—both positive law and normative analysis, in
both Delaware and other U.S. and international jurisdictions—does not
15. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).  Another
recent stakeholderist proposal, garnering much scholarly and media attention, was
the 2019 Business Roundtable statement. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Pur-
pose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUND-
TABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-
redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-
americans [https://perma.cc/S2LS-DSYN].  However, the Business Roundtable
members (several corporations’ fiduciaries) do not have any legal right or power
to single-handedly “redefine” any corporation’s purpose.  That purpose is dictated
by law, and can only be changed through law.  By definition, just as corporations
cannot lawfully breach the law, see infra Section I.C, and shareholders cannot law-
fully receive more than what is left after the corporation meets all of its other
obligations, see infra Section I.D, so are corporations legally required to act toward
their purpose, see infra Section I.A, and their fiduciaries are legally required to
cause them to do so, see infra Section I.E.  Accordingly, this Article expands upon
attempted legal reforms in the stakeholderist direction, not unilateral statements
expressing subjective wishes that the law was different.
16. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Pri-
macy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2002) (“[T]he debate over the social role
of the corporation remains unresolved.”).
17. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (“[C]orporation law, as a field of
intellectual effort, is dead in the United States. . . .  We have nothing left but our
great empty corporation statutes . . . .  [These are] shivering skeletons.”); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439 (2001); William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 789 (2017) (“Today’s corporate legal theory centers
on a small-scale policy discussion . . . .  If anything, the scope of corporate legal
theory will narrow even more. . . .  [C]orporate law will look more and more like
the rest of private law . . . .”); Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corpo-
rate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019).
18. Allen, supra note 2, at 264.
19. For the (negative) answer, see infra Section I.B (explaining how corporate
personhood, and the overall structure of corporate law—which differs from con-
tract or property law—promote the long-term, large-scale creation of economic
value); infra text accompanying notes 151–52 (explaining how employees, consum-
ers, and other stakeholders are always less well-protected by corporate law than by
non-corporate law).
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(and likely never did)20 support either the shareholderist or the
stakeholderist conception.  Each view is correct on some issues, and errs
on others.
This Article’s account of corporate law is centered around a simple,
yet profound, idea: the corporation is a person with a purpose.  This state-
ment has far-reaching implications.  Contrary to both prevailing ap-
proaches, fiduciaries (such as directors and officers) owe their duties
neither to shareholders, nor to stakeholders.  In fact, their loyalty runs
(and, under fiduciary law principles, must run) to one person: the corpora-
tion.  Fiduciaries’ mission is to cause the corporation to achieve its pur-
pose—which might be the lawful pursuit of profit (in the case of for-profit
corporations),21 or any other lawful purpose (such as those of benefit and
nonprofit corporations).22
In turn, the corporation owes various obligations to others, both stake-
holders and shareholders.  The protection of stakeholders23 is embedded
in the mandatory requirement that the corporation act lawfully, that is,
meet all obligations under positive law24 (which is mainly non-corporate
20. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 317 (quoting the 1847 case of Smith
v. Hurd, fully conforming with the theory presented in this Article).
21. Indeed, being an entity does not necessarily entail being a “social” entity.
Cf. Allen, supra note 2, at 271 (“[The] social entity conception sees the purpose of
the corporation as not individual but social.”).
22. Uniquely, corporate law provides no dictate as to how to achieve this; the
corporation can do whatever it wishes to pursue this open-ended imperative, and
possibly even fail in doing so, without facing legal sanction. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2020) (stating that the corporation’s goals might be “to
engage in any lawful act or activity”); infra text accompanying notes 128–29, 151.
This challenges the reliance, typical in corporate law and economics, on ex ante,
“contract”-based planning.  Corporate law might exhibit contract-like traits in some
situations, but its main normative underpinning is equity. See infra Sections I.D
(discussing equity-based share law), I.E (discussing corporate fiduciary law).  Ac-
cordingly, ex post determinations and adjudication are necessary and beneficial;
they are inherent to the corporate framework.  Any attempt to operate on a fully
“contractual” worldview ignores what corporate law is, resulting in both ineffi-
ciency (smaller pie) and unfairness (transfers of the pie to those who are not sup-
posed to get it—usually, the stronger party, such as a corporation’s fiduciaries).
23. The term “stakeholder” most broadly refers to any person having a rela-
tionship with the corporation, including non-residual claimants, residual claimants
(mostly known as “shareholders”), and fiduciaries. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRA-
TEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984) (“A stakeholder in an
organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”).  However, this Article em-
ploys a narrower definition, where “stakeholder” is any person with Hohfeldian
claims vis-à-vis the corporation, except for residual claimants and fiduciaries.  That is
because the latter two categories involve unique issues, which only corporations
give rise to, and which are treated within corporate law itself.  Therefore, each of
the three categories is considered in a separate section of this Article. See infra
Sections I.C, I.D, I.E.  In common usage, “stakeholder” typically denotes the first
category only.  It also seems preferable to “creditor” (used in the same sense in an
earlier article, see Raz, supra note 1) or “non-residual claimant.”
24. In this Article, “positive law” denotes the entire set of binding norms, as
opposed to wishes on what corporations might owe to certain people, or not owe to
7
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law—such as contract, employment, or environmental law).  The rights of
residual claimants (or shareholders) derive from the open-ended part of
the corporation’s purpose—for example, “the pursuit of profit.”  Since
that purpose must always be pursued lawfully, shareholders have the most
subordinated claim toward the corporation; the phrase “shareholder pri-
macy” is counterfactual.  Shareholders’ rights are not proprietary or fiduci-
ary, but also not merely contractual.  They are a unique product of
corporate law itself.
Therefore, corporate law consists of five building blocks: purpose,
personhood, stakeholders, residual claimants, and fiduciaries.  These, and
their mutual interactions, form the structure of corporate law.  This struc-
ture is unique to corporate law: a natural person can have neither direc-
tors, nor shareholders.  Modifying the content of one pillar does not alter
its very presence, nor the other elements.  A nonprofit corporation has a
different purpose than a for-profit corporation; yet, both are legal persons,
both are required to meet all of their legal obligations, both have residual
claimants with equitable rights, and both are entitled to have their fiducia-
ries loyally promote the corporation’s purpose.  A corporation’s managing
body may be staggered or not, comprised of inside or outside directors, or
be called a board of “managers” or “trustees” rather than “directors”; in
any case, its members owe fiduciary duties to the corporation—direct results
of the structure of corporate law.25  An identical set of economic, practi-
cal, and legal questions arise with respect to any corporation.  The theory
holds across time and jurisdictional boundaries, and is not subject to “pri-
vate ordering”; it is the foundation upon which contracting occurs.  Nor can
it be legislated around: if a statute truly eliminated one of the building
blocks, the resulting phenomenon would not be a corporation.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, the purpose-based theory of
corporate law is presented in five sections, corresponding to the building
blocks of corporate law (purpose, personhood, stakeholders, residual
claimants, and fiduciaries).  Because present-day corporate law is mainly
split between shareholderist and stakeholderist views, as described above,
care is taken to introduce the new theory in terms of how it diverges from,
or builds upon, our existing conceptions.  Part II applies the theory to
others, or what the law “ought” to be. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 790 (“For
those who decry [certain behaviors by corporations], the solution must come from
. . . bodies of positive law that constrain corporate behavior . . . and cannot ration-
ally rest on calls for corporate directors to ‘be patriotic.’”).  Positive law encom-
passes a very broad set of norms.  It includes equity, see infra note 308, and it may
even include disobedience, when certain “laws” are unjust (or plainly unlawful)
according to some other normative source (such as human rights, or simple rea-
son).  For a discussion of situations where disobedience might be lawful in some
sense, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 731–48
(2019).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 212–17 (discussing the fact that, due to
the corporation being an artificial person, it must always have a natural person
acting on its behalf and for its benefit).
8
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three high-stakes policy issues: shareholder activism, the Citizens United v.
FEC26 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.27 decisions, and the rise of
LLCs and other alternative corporations.  In each case, the purpose-based
theory leads to more refined, often pointed, conclusions.
Not only is corporate law not “dead,”28 it is more important than ever.
Yet, modern corporate law “seems to be in insoluble theoretic disarray,
with scholars scrambling to assemble a giant puzzle of ill-fitting pieces.”29
This Article assembles the puzzle of corporate law.
I. THE TRUE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW
Questions of structure and anatomy serve an important function in
any legal discipline.  These structural inquiries attempt to discern what is
common to all members of a certain group, and how these phenomena
interact with one another.  In legal terms, this primarily gives rise to ques-
tions such as: what types of Hohfeldian rights and duties does a given actor
have, and toward whom?30  Which legal “toolboxes”—sets of rules, princi-
ples, and doctrines—govern each actor or situation?
Structural inquiries exist on a higher hierarchical level than the vari-
ous resolutions made within each toolbox, which are dynamic and change-
able, as opposed to the structure itself.  For example, even if the rules of
“capital lock-in” (which restrict shareholders’ ability to withdraw assets
from the corporation at will) are different among jurisdictions,31 at least
two building blocks are constantly present: “shareholder” and “corpora-
tion.”  Professors Balganesh and Parchomovsky describe this as the distinc-
tion between “structural” (or “jural”) and “normative,” dynamic
meanings.32  While “[t]he jural meaning refers to the structural core un-
dergirding a legal concept,” “[t]he normative meaning refers to the mean-
ing that . . . [the] concept . . . come[s] to be cloaked in as a result of
26. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
27. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 533–34 (2005).
30. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
31. See Mariana Pargendler, How Universal Is the Corporate Form? Reflections on
the Dwindling of Corporate Attributes in Brazil, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–19
(2019) (describing a trend in Brazilian courts of allowing shareholders, under cer-
tain circumstances, to redeem their shares, even when the corporation is not in
liquidation proceedings; also viewing this as a divergence from normal “corporate
law”).  As the discussion here demonstrates, even if some dynamic choices in Bra-
zil’s corporate law are unique, it is still corporate law, and the entities it governs
are corporations.
32. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in
the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015).  In that context, the term “dy-
namic” is substituted here for “normative,” simply because legal theorists mostly
use “normative” as the opposite of “positive,” which differs from Balganesh and
Parchomovsky’s usage.
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external interpretive influences, which may in turn be drawn from a vari-
ety of situational goals.”33  Applying this to our example, the fixed structure
(“shareholder” and “corporation”) is required for us to discuss the dynamic
question (“when should a shareholder be allowed to withdraw assets from
the corporation?”).
Within corporate law, the leading work in this area is Professor
Reinier Kraakman and co-authors’ The Anatomy of Corporate Law.34  As that
book argues, every corporation presumably has five “defining characteris-
tics”:35 legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated
management with a board structure, and investor ownership.36  One may
ask, however, why these five?  Indeed, “The Anatomy of Corporate Law does
not offer any general theory as to how the various elements of its typology
fit together.”37
This Part of the Article fills that gap.  It reveals that only one of the
five characteristics—corporate personhood—is a necessary feature of all
corporations.38  Other characteristics can be contracted around or other-
wise modified.  A corporation might feature non-limited liability;39 non-
transferable shares;40 non-delegated management;41 and a non-financial
investor (say, an employee) as its residual claimant.42  All these do not
make the entity any less of a corporation.  In other words, the latter four
characteristics are modifiable, dynamic choices; they do not define any of
the invariable, structural issues generated by the concept of the
corporation.
33. Id. at 1244.
34. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2017).
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 5–15.
37. David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1540
(2004) (book review).
38. The authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law make a similar statement. See
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 31 (“[O]f the five defining characteristics of the
corporate form, only one—legal personality—clearly requires special rules of law.
The other characteristics could, in principle, be adopted by contract . . . .” (foot-
note omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 3(4) (UK) (allowing for a company
with “no limit on the liability of its members”).
40. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The
articles of incorporation, the bylaws, an agreement among shareholders, or an
agreement between shareholders and the corporation may impose restrictions on
the transfer or registration of transfer of shares of the corporation.”).
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2020) (“Unless otherwise pro-
vided in a limited liability company agreement, the management of a limited liabil-
ity company shall be vested in its members . . . .”).  Even in regard to a narrow-
sense “Delaware corporation,” the same person can be both shareholder and fidu-
ciary. See, e.g., infra Section II.A.  In a private corporation, there might be no dele-
gation of management at all.
42. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 152 (“The board of directors may authorize capital stock
to be issued for consideration consisting of cash, any tangible or intangible prop-
erty or any benefit to the corporation, or any combination thereof.”).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/2
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 533
This Part provides a new, more refined account of corporate law’s
anatomy, which applies to every corporation.  This inclusivity is possible
because the theory relies on a set of highly fundamental notions (for in-
stance, the concept of equity, or Hohfeldian rights and duties), which can-
not be contracted or legislated away.  As explained below, the five building
blocks of corporate law are purpose,43 personhood,44 stakeholders,45
residual claimants,46 and fiduciaries.47  They are structurally related to
one another, and particularly to the first building block—the corpora-
tion’s purpose.
This account resolves the “blanket pulling” problem described at the
beginning of this Article,48 as it provides a complete map of corporate law’s
structure.  For example, a commentator might recognize corporate per-
sonhood, yet believe that shareholders have purely “contractual” rights, or
that the corporation is a creature of public law;49 the structure presented
here confirms the first and corrects the latter two.  Consistent with this
objective, much of the discussion in this Part directly addresses, and cor-
rects, various misconceptions encountered in the corporate law commu-
nity.  Among other contributions, this more precise anatomy provides an
alternative to the shareholderist–stakeholderist dichotomy.  It also re-
sponds to other inaccurate, seemingly exclusive choices, such as between
“contract” and “property” theories of the firm.  Moreover, as Part II below
illustrates, this theory allows us to better understand and address a wide
range of current policy issues.
A. The Corporation’s Purpose
Every corporation has a purpose.  Corporations, which are legal per-
sons,50 are similar in this regard to natural persons (humans), also operat-
ing to achieve a certain life purpose.  A human may have a mix of life
purposes, and easily change them by simple choice.  One may wish to live
for the pursuit of economic profit one day, and move to a communal vil-
lage the next.  This fundamentally arises from the fact that a human being
is an end in oneself, with complete freedom to pursue happiness, within
the bounds of law.
43. See infra Section I.A.
44. See infra Section I.B.
45. See infra Section I.C.
46. See infra Section I.D.
47. See infra Section I.E.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 3–5.
49. See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate
Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 458–77, 483–85.  For an example of “blanket pulling”
in the opposite direction, see Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law
(July 17, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421009
[https://perma.cc/AM7G-LR2V] (correctly noting that shareholders are unique
claimants and have more than contractual rights, but incorrectly viewing share-
holders’ claims toward the corporation or its assets as property rights).
50. See infra Section I.B.
11
Raz: A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
534 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 523
In contrast, a corporation cannot feel happiness, at least not in the
human sense.  It is a legal person, whose existence is meant to increase
human well-being,51 albeit only through the concept of corporate per-
sonhood and the overall structure of corporate law.  Also, lacking its own
physical faculties, the corporation’s purpose must be determined by other
people—initially, its founders.52
The most important difference between corporations and humans is
that the former have a specific, non-easily-modifiable purpose.53  As Pro-
fessor Adam Winkler notes, “corporations are not truly ‘free’ in the way
that individuals can be.  A [natural] person can choose her own values,
preferring to prioritize personal wealth, social welfare, the environment,
or law and order.  A [for-profit] corporation, however, is legally obligated
to prioritize profit, at least in the long term.”54
Over the last few years, growing attention is being paid to the idea
that the core concept of corporate law—the building block around which
all others, including personhood, fiduciaries’ duties, and stakeholders’
and shareholders’ rights, are arranged—is purpose (rather than “con-
tract,” “property,” or “fiduciary law”).  Corporate purpose, and its place in
the matrix of corporate law, is the subject of rapidly expanding scholar-
ship.55  Recent papers by Professors Paul Miller and Andrew Gold discuss
purpose within a broader inquiry of corporate law’s structure; similarly to
this Article, these texts (part of the New Private Law movement) employ
an integrative approach, demonstrating that corporate law is not any other
field, but has its unique identity, combining numerous legal concepts and
traditions.56  Many of these works, however, are written from a
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1663 (“[W]e owe no allegiance to corporations . . . without reference to
the idea that people are involved.”).
52. See Raz, supra note 1, at 273–74 (discussing founders’ role in setting the
corporation’s purpose), 275 (“[D]ue to the limits of the corporation’s physical
nature, there is simply no way it could determine its own purpose and goals without
other people, and the choices they make.”).
53. In some cases, that purpose might not be easily determined ex ante.  This
Section argues that at least in the most ubiquitous type of corporation—the for-
profit corporation (as well as many types of nonprofit corporations)—it can.
54. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 388 (2018).
55. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881
(2017); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Personhood and
Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 260 (D. Gordon Smith
& Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018); David Ciepley, Corporate Directors as Purpose Fiducia-
ries: Reclaiming the Corporate Law We Need (July 29, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426747 [https://perma.cc/7C4Y-JFSP].
56. See Paul B. Miller, Corporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW
PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily L.
Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3432033 [https://perma.cc/4KXQ-XYV6]; Paul B.
Miller & Andrew S. Gold, The Corporation as a Category in Private Law, in RESEARCH
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stakeholderist perspective—essentially contrasting a “purpose” approach
with “shareholder primacy”—or choose not to elaborate on what is the
corporation’s purpose, instead only stating (correctly) that, whatever it is,
it shapes fiduciaries’ duties.
This Article takes the next steps: first, in the remainder of this Sec-
tion, it expands on the term “purpose” in corporate law, and provides a
positive and normative overview of the purpose of for-profit and other cor-
porations.  It then relates purpose to the other four building blocks of
corporate law, all arranged around the corporation’s purpose: per-
sonhood allows the corporation to achieve its purpose better than through
any non-corporate framework;57 stakeholders enjoy the requirement to
obey positive law, embedded in the corporation’s purpose (hence, there is
nothing wrong, and certainly not legally actionable, with a lawful profit-
seeking purpose);58 the rights of residual claimants are derived from, and
related via equity to, the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose;59 and fiduci-
aries’ duty is to act so that the corporation achieves its purpose.60  This
Article does not aim to discuss every question pertaining to corporate pur-
pose, of which there are many.61  Rather, it provides a theory of corporate
law as a whole, with purpose at its center.
The term “purpose” itself requires elaboration.  The corporation’s
ends are determined on two different levels.  The higher is what this Arti-
cle calls “purpose,” which is a somewhat more general statement—for ex-
ample, “the lawful pursuit of profit”—provided by law, and attaching to a
certain form of corporation.  The lower level is what may be called the
corporation’s “goals”—for example, “to engage in construction” or “any
lawful activity”—which are flexible choices, appearing in the corporation’s
constitutional documents, and possibly changing from one corporation to
another, even if both are of the same form.  Some corporate statutes, in-
cluding Delaware’s, refer to the corporation’s goals as its “purpose,”62 but
the difference is legally and practically significant.63
57. See infra Section I.B.
58. See infra Section I.C.
59. See infra Section I.D.
60. See infra Section I.E.
61. Such questions include, among others: who should be able to set the cor-
poration’s purpose?  Who should decide whether or not the corporation is acting
toward its purpose (shareholders, fiduciaries, courts, or someone else)?  How can
corporations’ purpose be encapsulated in one sentence (such as “the lawful pur-
suit of profit”), a much more compact purpose compared to that of human be-
ings?  How and to what extent can purpose be contractually determined or
modified?  While the answers are often quite clear under positive law, they leave
much room for policy debate.
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (2020) (“The certificate of incorporation
shall set forth: . . .  The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or
promoted.  It shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the corporation is
to engage in any lawful act or activity . . . .”).
63. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1319, 1364–68 (discussing the difference between “strategic” and “tactical” cor-
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As suggested by the very existence of distinct terms, such as “non-
profit corporation,” “cooperative,” “voluntary association,” and “for-profit
corporation,” these different forms have different purposes, and in the
case of the latter, it is the pursuit of profit (which, as shown here, invaria-
bly means the lawful pursuit of profit).  From a legal standpoint, there is
nothing wrong with a person lawfully pursuing its own benefit: as Section
I.C below explains, no legal sanction can be imposed on a corporation
that acts in full accordance with law; this also means that the corporation
is free to pursue profit, as long it does not harm anyone else in any legally
sanctionable manner.  Indeed, a promoter establishing a new for-profit
corporation buys a “prepackaged product,”64 at least in part, and one of its
provisions is the corporation’s purpose.  A change of corporate form (and
purpose) is possible, but it must be done in a manner assuring that the
corporation still complies with all of its legal and equitable obligations.65
This simple statement—that the first part of the corporation’s pur-
pose (“lawful”) encompasses, by definition, all the protection stakeholders
are legally entitled to, and the second part (such as “pursuit of profit,” or
any other, once it is determined) can therefore not be subject to legal
challenge—provides a strong normative justification for corporations’ li-
cense to pursue their own benefit.  How do we know that, under positive
law, the for-profit corporation’s purpose truly is the lawful pursuit of
profit?  In Delaware, no section of the main corporate statute66 explicitly
says so.  This fact, however, can be clearly inferred from a variety of case
law and other sources, including formative cases of Delaware law.
For instance, 1989’s Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.67 de-
cision is generally regarded as a victory for the stakeholderist side.  In that
case, shareholder-plaintiffs failed to prevent a corporation, through its
board of directors, from implementing defensive measures meant to block
a high-premium, hostile tender offer.  The decision itself, however, reveals
a more nuanced picture.  The court discusses the corporation’s purpose—as
distinct from those of both its shareholders and stakeholders—and con-
cludes it is the pursuit of profit:
porate purpose, similar to the distinction made here between “purpose” and
“goals”).
64. See, e.g., Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 846–47 (2008)
(“[M]andatory terms guarantee that certain core qualities are associated with the
particular ‘brand’ of business entity called a ‘Delaware corporation.’  The exis-
tence of that brand benefits all Delaware corporations by saving the expense inves-
tors would otherwise incur to investigate whether a particular entity had or lacked
any of those core qualities.” (footnote omitted)).
65. This requires the consent of those who have the authority to determine
the corporation’s purpose—initially, its founders, and later the corporation’s
residual claimants, to whom the founders’ authority passed, see Raz, supra note 1, at
273 n.75.  For detailed discussion of this point, see infra note 209 and accompany-
ing text.
66. Delaware General Corporation Law, tit. 8, ch. 1.
67. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Delaware law imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation.  This broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action
. . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . .  [D]irectors, gener-
ally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in
its best interest . . . .68
The Paramount v. Time court does not elaborate much on where the
profit-enhancing mandate comes from.  Yet, even in a case shareholders
lost, the nature of the corporation’s own purpose seemed indisputable to
the court.
In the well-known footnote 55 to his Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.69 decision, Chancellor Allen presents,
in great arithmetic detail, a situation where the corporation’s economic
interests diverge from those of any natural person—both shareholders and
stakeholders.  As the Chancellor then remarks,
[The optimal] result will not be reached by a director who thinks
he owes duties directly to shareholders only.  It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a
legal and economic entity. . . . [C]ircumstances may arise when
the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders
(or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group inter-
ested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to
act.70
Credit Lyonnais directly invokes two of corporate law’s building
blocks—personhood and fiduciaries—and correctly concludes that direc-
tors’ duties run to the corporate person.  Although Chancellor Allen does
68. Id. at 1150 (citation omitted) (emphases added).
69. No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
70. Id. at *108 n.55.  Chancellor Allen writes that directors’ duties run to the
entity “[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency,” id.
at *108, but not much in his substantive analysis turns on this; whether solvent,
close to insolvency, or insolvent, the corporation is supposed to act to increase (or,
at a minimum, protect) its net worth.  The words “at least” in the Chancellor’s
opinion are meaningful, given the many other Delaware cases surveyed through-
out this Article (including landmark cases such as Paramount v. Time), which dis-
cuss fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, yet did not arise in vicinity to
insolvency.  For detailed discussion of this point, see Production Resources Group,
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004) (clarifying, among
other things, that “the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of the
director’s duties, which is the firm itself”).  The leading Delaware authority stating
this position (while extensively citing Production Resources) is North American Catholic
Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–03 (Del.
2007) (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation [ei-
ther when it is solvent or insolvent]. . . .  [D]irectors . . . have a fiduciary duty to
exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent
corporation.”).
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not explicitly mention “purpose,” his economic analysis (preceding the
above quote) makes clear that, in the first place, the corporation is there
to pursue a certain purpose—the maximization of its own economic
value—and, in turn, directors’ role is to cause the corporation to do pre-
cisely that.
Moving into the computer age, 2010’s eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark71 decision proceeds similarly to Paramount v. Time and Credit Ly-
onnais: it does not engage in deep-level analysis of the normative justifica-
tions for the lawful pursuit of profit, yet, it states that this purpose does
attach to the for-profit corporation.  As the court plainly remarks, “I can-
not accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that . . . seeks not to maximize the
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation.”72  In another case
involving a technology company, 2013’s In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litiga-
tion73 decision states as follows:
[Directors’ decisions should] benefit the corporation as a whole
. . . by increasing the value of the corporation . . . .  [T]he duty of
loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the
corporation over the long-term . . . .  [R]esidual claimants [are]
the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value . . . .74
As Section I.E below also discusses, Trados makes clear both that the
corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of its profit (or “value”), and
that this is separate from the effect on shareholders, who only ultimately
and conditionally—through the structure of corporate law—gain any ben-
efit from the corporation’s success.
Indeed, both Paramount v. Time and Trados are cases in which share-
holders lost, but the corporation’s purpose was determined to be the lawful
pursuit of profit.  This clarifies the difference between the purpose-based
theory, presented here, and so-called “shareholder primacy,” or
shareholderism generally.  Shareholders, who are fully distinct from the
corporation, might not see any direct blessing in the corporation’s profits.
A for-profit corporation might, for example, engage in building space
launch systems (as a certain well-known Delaware corporation does),75 un-
doubtedly a long-term, large-scale, capital-intensive mission.  Corporate
law mandates that the corporation’s profits and assets are its own—not its
shareholders’—and any access to them by shareholders is constrained by
the facts of corporate law (for example, the corporation’s discretion as to
whether or not to distribute a dividend, or its ability to deploy defensive
measures against a takeover).  Thus, even over an extremely long period,
71. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
72. Id. at 34.
73. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
74. Id. at 36–41 (emphases added).
75. See Raz, supra note 1, at 288 n.130 and accompanying text (discussing
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., also known as SpaceX, in a similar
context).
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the corporation’s profit-seeking purpose can benefit the corporation, and
allow it to continue developing and expanding its operations—but not, in
any immediate or tangible way, its shareholders.  The latter have an equita-
ble, more-than-contractual claim toward the corporation, and are entitled
to its profits when it either decides to distribute them, or dissolves.76  That
claim, however, does not result in anything that can be called “share-
holder primacy.”  It exists within a framework—corporate law—that pro-
motes the corporation’s pursuit of its own purpose.
B. The Corporation’s Personhood
Every corporation is a person.77  This says a lot about what the corpo-
ration is not: while others have suggested that the corporation might be
“property,”78 an “aggregate” of other people,79 a “nexus” of contracts,80 a
“concession” from the state,81 or a “mediating hierarchy,”82 none of these
models fully cohere with the corporation’s true nature.  In short, the cor-
76. See infra Section I.D.
77. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 5–8 (discussing “[l]egal per-
sonality” as a “core structural characteristic[ ]” of the corporation); Raz, supra note
1, at 286 n.120 (citing a broad range of statutory, case law, and scholarly sources to
that effect); infra text accompanying note 317.
78. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 264–65 (“In the first conception, the corpo-
ration is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners.”); Katsuhito Iwai,
Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative
Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 592 (1999) (“[W]hat does a corporate
shareholder own?  The corporation, of course.  It is the corporation itself as a
‘thing’ that a corporate shareholder legally owns.”).  For a refutation of the prop-
erty model, see, for example, Raz, supra note 1, at 285–87.
79. See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (“[T]he rights and duties of an incorpo-
rated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who compose it,
and not of an imaginary being.”), quoted in Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of
the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458 (1987).  The
“aggregate” and “property” views, see supra note 78, although not identical, are
closely related. See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM.
J. COMP. L. 39, 42 (2000) (“The aggregate or partnership model of the corpora-
tion, which was prevalent in the 19th century, assumed [a role as the ‘owners’ of
the corporate enterprise] for shareholders . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
80. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983) (“An organization is the nexus of contracts, writ-
ten and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers.”);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (“The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for
contracting relationships . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); see also Coates,
supra note 3, at 810–15 (discussing the artificial entity theory in detail), 831 (ex-
plaining how the artificial entity theory lost valence in modern reality).
82. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276–87 (1999).
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poration is not a collection of anything—people, assets, contracts, or
rights.  Every corporation is one, single entity.  Other people can make
contracts with, or have rights toward (not “in”) the corporation, which
owns its assets, and itself is unownable.83  Each of the other views can have
some intuitive appeal, in some situations, but only this simple statement—
the corporation is a person—consistently adheres to law and day-to-day real-
ity.  A nexus of contracts cannot own property or make new contracts, only
a person can;84 the concession theory has nothing to do with the way cor-
porations come into existence today;85 the mediating hierarchy concept
might explain how the corporation’s fiduciaries ought to make decisions,
but does not describe the nature of the corporation itself; and so on.
The unifying motive behind the various inaccurate models of the cor-
poration, mentioned above, might be very simple: to some, the sentence
“the corporation is a person” sounds plain strange.  After all, humans are
persons, and other things are not, correct?  Not exactly.  The corporation
is a product of a certain field of law, administered by humans.  The same is
true of any other legal concept, including “right,” “duty,” “property,” “con-
tract” and “person.”  The corporation is a legal person, not a human.86  As
a rule, the corporation has the legal capacity of a human.87  Assuming that
the law’s overarching aim of promoting human well-being is pursued, law
is capable of making a certain phenomenon into a person, or “right-and-
duty-bearing unit.”88  The corporate person is no more a “fiction” than law
itself is a fiction.
83. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 286 (“Shareholders do not own the corpora-
tion; they own shares.  While it is meaningful to discuss the ownership of a right
toward a corporation, it is unclear what might it mean . . . to ‘own’ a corporation—
another person, with interests and volition of its own.” (footnote omitted)).
84. See, e.g., id. at 284; infra note 221 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
86. This differs, for example, from Otto von Gierke’s more extreme views.
See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 11, at 40 (“In the late nineteenth century, the
eminent German legal historian Otto Gierke theorized that when individuals
unite, spiritually and psychologically, for a common purpose they create a sepa-
rate, living person that has a will of its own.” (footnote omitted)), 76–83 (discuss-
ing in detail Gierke’s “Theory of the Corporation as Group-Person” and its
spiritual and collectivist allusions).
87. Some corporate statutes say so explicitly. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1501 (2020) (“[A] business corporation shall have the legal capacity of natural
persons to act.”).  There are things humans can do and corporations cannot—
some, because allowing them contradicts our understanding of other legal and
social institutions (for example, voting in the general election); and some, because
the corporation inherently lacks certain traits, see, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., 110
A.3d 1257 (Del. Ch. 2015) (preventing a corporation from serving as an expert
witness).  These are exceptions; the rule is that a corporation has the legal capacity
of a natural person.  This fact is supported by other parts of corporate law’s struc-
ture, namely, the existence of fiduciaries—humans through whom the corporation
operates in the physical world. See infra Section I.E.
88. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655 passim (1926).
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To those for whom corporate personhood seems morally appalling,
three responses may be offered: first, corporate personhood has been de-
vised by humans, is ultimately meant to benefit them, and in fact does so,
as evidenced by The New York Times Company not going out of business
every time one of its shareholders dies.  Second, by their own communitar-
ian standard, these objectors do not offer a compelling alternative; would
it be better if the corporation was “owned” by its shareholders?  Third, the
objectors’ true discontent seems to be with the things some corporations
do—for instance, funnel excessive amounts of money to support political
candidates89—and not with corporations’ ability to do anything at all, while
bearing their own rights and duties (including the duty to obey the law90).
The question, then, is why must every corporation be a person?  Why
cannot at least some corporations, on the basis of either state law or pri-
vate ordering, be something else, say, an aggregate of shareholders?  The
answer lies at the most definitional level.  What distinguishes corporate law
is the existence of a corpus, or “body”—the corporate person.91  Far more
than a linguistic matter, the presence of a distinct legal person, bearing its
own rights and duties, allows corporate law to produce a unique set of
doctrinal, economic, and practical benefits.92 In turn, corporate law’s
unique benefits enable the corporation to achieve its purpose (for exam-
ple, the lawful pursuit of profit) better than any mechanism provided by
other legal frameworks.  Therefore, the law of corporate personhood can
be viewed as a means to an end—the promotion of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  Corporate personhood, like corporate law’s other building blocks,
revolves around corporate purpose.
Although a group of individuals can act toward a common purpose,
we are then not in the realm of corporate law; at most, we are dealing with
non-corporate partnership law,93 contract law, or trust law.  Each of these
come with their own doctrines, economic implications, and practices, dis-
tinct from those of corporate law.  For example, the human actors (or at
least one of them) can never enjoy full limited liability: lacking a separate
person to which duties attach, the individuals themselves bear those
duties.
89. See infra Section II.B.
90. See infra Section I.C.
91. See Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 478 (“The very term ‘corporation’
derives from the Latin word corpus which translates into English as the word
‘body,’ which presents an entity that is authorized by the state to act as an
individual.”).
92. See, e.g., id. at 526 (“Unless such a separate entity is created . . . the basic
objective of the corporation, which is to create an economic framework for amas-
sing capital to be deployed in economic activity, cannot be reached.”); de
Fontenay, supra note 1, at 201 (“Recognizing the corporation as the owner of [its]
assets . . . is one of the defining features of the corporation and the key to its
success in fostering economic growth precisely because it prevents individual
shareholders from removing productive business assets at will.”).
93. See infra note 272.
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On the flip side, just as shareholders are offered limited liability, the
existence of a separate person—having its own characteristics and rights
(in addition to duties)—means that other individuals’ wishes and pur-
poses are not those of the corporation,94 and that fiduciary duties run to
the corporation, not to shareholders or stakeholders.95  Indeed, one of
the main justifications for having corporate law in the first place, as opposed
to contract, property, trust, or general fiduciary law, is that unlike these
frameworks, corporate law serves to limit each individual’s freedom of ac-
tion,96 thus promoting a purpose that is not fully congruent with, or
under the control of, any of the involved human actors.
It is therefore puzzling to see many scholars, particularly on the
shareholderist, or law and economics side, write about corporate law as if
it was concerned with an agency problem between only two actors, manag-
ers and shareholders.97  This kind of scholarship inexplicably ignores the
one person at the heart of corporate law: the corporation.  The ameliora-
tion of agency costs is the focus of much of corporate law; yet, these
agency problems are mainly between the corporation and its fiduciaries.
Crucially, the corporate person also does not have identity of interests with
its shareholders: multiple “agency problems,” as well as legitimately differ-
ing interests, exist between shareholders and the corporation, distinct from the
agency problems between the corporation and its fiduciaries.98  Put sim-
ply, “the corporation’s fortunes might not translate into those of its share-
94. See supra Section I.A.
95. See infra Section I.E.
96. See de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 195 (“[A] core goal of corporate law is to
. . . constrain individual behavior.  For this reason, it is a comparatively poor choice
of regime in which to expand individual rights.” (emphasis added)), 197
(“[C]orporate law serves to quash individual voices and actions by design . . . .”).  Of
course, the ultimate aim of corporations (and corporate law) is to enhance human
well-being. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 51, at 1663.  Precisely to this end, corpo-
rate legal mechanisms constrain involved actors’ behavior (as all law does; corpo-
rate law more structurally and evenhandedly so).
97. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 29–30 (“The first [agency
problem] involves the conflict between the firm’s owners and its hired manag-
ers. . . . The problem lies in assuring that the managers are responsive to the
owners’ interests . . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate
Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 686–87 (2009) (presenting the main debate in cor-
porate law as relating to conflicts between “managers” and “investors”); Zohar Go-
shen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017) (“The subject of most corporate
law scholarship is the conflict of interests between managers . . . and
shareholders.”).
98. For detailed discussion of conflicts or disparities between shareholders
and the corporation, see Raz, supra note 1, at 272, 276–78, 282–85, 291 n.145,
293–95, 304–05, 311–19.  These issues are addressed in the field of share law, see
infra Section I.D, which is distinct from corporate fiduciary law, and is based on
non-fiduciary equity.  A clear example of share law is the law of appraisal: “Direc-
tors can satisfy their fiduciary duties even when a sales process is insufficient to
achieve the stock’s fair value under [DGCL] Section 262.”  Brief of Law, Econom-
ics and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners-
Appellees and Affirmance at 6, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/2
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 543
holders, or part of them.”99  Both law-and-economists and Delaware
jurists, generally mindful of corporate personhood,100 are likely glossing
over this very point when they use inaccurate, practically impossible
phrases such as “fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.”101
As it turns out, law and economics scholarship itself attaches the high-
est import to the concept of corporate personhood (despite often not call-
ing it that, instead using terms such as “entity” and “firm,” all pointing to
the same phenomenon102).  Hovenkamp,103 Macey, and Strine104 provide
useful summaries of the major works in this area.
For example, it is one of the greatest law-and-economists of all time,
Ronald Coase, who in 1937’s The Nature of the Firm105 does not mention the
word “shareholder” or “stockholder” even once.  Rather, the “firm” is the
central actor.  It is the firm that decides, based on transaction costs,
whether to produce goods and services itself, or outsource certain tasks.
The firm as such acts, owns its property, and reaps the gains, or bears the
costs, of its activities.  The firm is the opposite of an aggregate of people
contracting with one another, what Coase refers to as the “price mecha-
nism.”106  Clearly, the firm—the corporation—is a distinct legal person.
To a large degree, The Nature of the Firm is a seminal text about the eco-
nomic meaning of corporate personhood.
Following a discussion of Coase’s article and its relation to modern
law and economics, Professor Jason Scott Johnston concludes that “the
role of corporate law is both more varied and more creative than either
Berle and Means or Easterbrook and Fischel presume, [as it is] a funda-
mental determinant of strategic bargaining over the terms of the corpo-
rate contract.”107  The fundamental, unwaivable structure of corporate law
172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016), http://www.chancerydaily.com.objects-
us-east-1.dream.io/upload/589a4ed825b0e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3W2-VVM8].
99. Raz, supra note 1, at 260.
100. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 68, 70, 74 and accompanying text; infra note 220
and accompanying text.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 206–07.
102. On the linguistic difficulties plaguing the corporate law community, see
supra note 4.
103. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW 172–83 (2014)
(discussing, in a chapter titled “The Separation of Ownership and Control,” works
by, among others, Berle and Means, Marshall, Coase, Fisher, and Fama and Miller,
and explaining how they relate to the differentiation between corporations and
their shareholders).
104. Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 463–77 (discussing important law and
economics works, mainly within the “nexus of contracts” and “separation of owner-
ship and control” theories, and explaining how they relate to corporate
personhood).
105. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
106. Id. passim.
107. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory
of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 244 (1993).  Johnston makes this observation
while discussing constrained rationality, which is one way to examine the central
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determines, among other things, the boundaries of “private ordering.”  In
another important conceptual work, Professors Rock and Wachter, ex-
panding on Coase’s article, remark that “firms [are] islands of conscious
power.  These islands [are] surrounded by seas, . . . namely markets.”108
The person bearing that consciousness (with the help of its human repre-
sentatives)109 is the corporation.
In modern law and economics, corporate personhood remains as sali-
ent.  Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, in their well-regarded 2000 ar-
ticle,110 explore the economic benefits achieved through “asset
partitioning”—simply, the fact that the corporation’s assets and obliga-
tions are its own, not its shareholders’ (and vice versa).  Asset partitioning
allows the corporation and its stakeholders to deal with one another far
more cheaply and conveniently, as they need not inquire into each share-
holder’s financial or legal situation.  This economic wizardry is made pos-
sible through a specialized legal framework—corporate law: “In the
absence of organizational law, it would be effectively impossible to create
the affirmative asset partitioning that is the core characteristic of a legal
entity.”111
Recently, law and economics scholar Marcel Kahan co-wrote: “What is
a corporation, and why does it matter? . . .  [H]ow courts characterize the
corporation significantly affects legal doctrines that impact not only the
corporation, but also third parties such as shareholders,”112 affirming both the
importance and the very existence of corporate personhood.  In essence,
the human-welfare-increasing function of the corporation is channeled
through the law of corporate purpose—”the lawful pursuit of profit”—and
is not dependent upon the individual, diverging, largely unascertainable,
and changing wishes of shareholders.113
phenomenon corporate law is meant to both facilitate and deal with: open-ended-
ness.  Due to this, involved actors’ rationality, or ability to assess what is going to
happen and act accordingly, is inherently constrained, and unique mechanisms
(namely, corporate fiduciary law and equity-based share law) are mandatorily
required.
108. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1697 (2001).
109. See infra Section I.E.
110. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organiza-
tional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
111. Id. at 406.  For criticisms of that argument, and a refutation of those
criticisms, see infra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
112. Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate
“Contracts”, 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 266–67 (2018) (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155,
159–218 (2019) (“[S]tartups involve heterogeneous shareholders in overlapping
governance roles that give rise to vertical and horizontal tensions between foun-
ders, investors, executives, and employees. . . .  The value of the corporation itself
. . . best reflects the sum of the participants’ interests and it is to the corporation
that the fiduciary duty should be owed.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law
History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 903 (2016) (“[I]t [is] not credible to equate
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/2
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 545
The fact that corporations are wholly separate persons, distinct from
their shareholders and anyone else, is far from merely an academic issue.
It is highly practical, having profound implications at every turn of legal
life.  Many are discussed throughout this Article,114 but to give a taste of
how numerous the consequences of corporate personhood are, consider
the salient example of mandatory arbitration clauses in corporate charters
and bylaws.
In recent years, mandatory arbitration has become the most signifi-
cant barrier for the enforcement of private law rights in the U.S.115  In
essence, the arbitration clause has become the only truly binding part of
many consumer and employment contracts.116  A somewhat different
question, however, is what happens when such clauses are inserted into a
corporation’s constitutional documents.  Provisions of this kind would
mandate that all corporate law or “internal affairs” disputes (namely, law-
suits against the corporation’s fiduciaries, or by shareholders against the
corporation) shall be arbitrated, rather than litigated as a direct or deriva-
tive action in court.  Should they be valid and enforceable?  At least pre-
sumptively, no.
The reason is that corporate constitutional documents are simply not
contracts.  Rather, they are equity documents, meant to accomplish a
unique feat, possible only through a structured legal framework: the crea-
tion of a corporate person, and the pursuit of its purpose through loyal
fiduciaries, while meeting its obligations to both stakeholders and residual
the views of the corporation to those of its diverse and changing stockholders.”).
This point also bears on the “shareholders are stakeholders” argument, see infra
notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
114. For an additional example, in one case, corporate personhood led to a
$246 million greater award of attorneys’ fees. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1252, 1263, 1265 (Del. 2012) (noting that, although 81% of the
derivatively-represented corporation’s outstanding shares were held by defendant
itself, “the corporation was harmed and the total recovery is awarded to the corpo-
ration . . . —not ‘nominally’ but actually,” so the $304 million fee award is based
on the entire amount of recovery).
115. Boilerplate arbitration clauses, at least in the U.S., usually mean that one
party’s rights are not truly channeled to alternative dispute resolution, but practi-
cally become unenforceable.  Among other reasons, that is because non-arbitra-
tion methods, such as the class action, are the only effective way to resolve certain
disputes, or even have them litigated in the first place. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflec-
tions on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 322–31 (2013);
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
116. For a detailed and troubling account of the practice of “deleting” rights
(including those presumably granted in the contract itself) through standard form
contracts, while asserting that such provisions truly arise from each party’s consent,
or have the power to completely override other sources of law, see MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2013).
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claimants.  As a series of articles by leading corporate law scholars117 has
recently shown, corporate constitutional documents have, at most, certain
contract-like traits, in some situations.  Primarily, these instruments are
meant to deal with the distinctive issues that arise in the corporate envi-
ronment.  Because the corporation itself is party to its constitutional docu-
ments,118 these are not merely agreements between shareholders and
managers; instead, they are a mechanism that must serve to promote,
rather than obstruct, the reason for the corporation’s existence in the first
place.119
The most pertinent problem, in this regard, is the absolute power and
information asymmetries between the corporation and its fiduciaries.120
For one, fiduciaries can amend the corporation’s constitutional docu-
ments in a practically one-sided manner (pointing to their non-consent-
based, non-contractual nature).121  Further, given the low observability of
fiduciaries’ conduct, and the unique, court-based enforcement mecha-
nisms of corporate law (namely, the derivative action), mandatory arbitra-
tion would in many cases rob the corporation of any meaningful way to
vindicate its rights.  It also would eliminate the information-revealing and
deterrence-generating effects of litigation in open court.122  When courts
face this issue, they must remain mindful of these fundamental facts—or
the enforceability of corporate law’s norms, governing some of the most
important institutions in our society, would be in existential danger.123
117. James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 257 (2015); Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate
Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 373 (2018); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The
Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583
(2016).  Particularly, see Lipton, supra, at 587 (“[C]orporate governance arrange-
ments are not contractual.  Contract law is organized around a theory of con-
sent . . . .  Corporations, by contrast, are organized around principles more akin to
trust law . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 466 (“[T]he various constitu-
ents to the corporation must, of course, have counter-parties.  This counterparty is
an entity, namely the corporation itself.”); Raz, supra note 1, at 258 n.4, 272 n.72
(citing statutory and case law demonstrating that the corporation is party to its
constitutional documents).
119. On the impossibility of shareholders waiving the corporation’s rights, see
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 722–23 (2011).
120. See infra Sections I.E, II.C.
121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 117.
122. See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Mandatory Arbitration and the Market for Reputation,
99 B.U. L. REV. 873 (2019) (exploring the “reputational deterrence” generated by
litigation, and not by arbitration, in the information-asymmetrical environment
typical of corporate and securities law).
123. In the U.S., this topic is currently in flux. See, e.g., Cydney Posner,
Mandatory Arbitration Shareholder Proposal Goes to Court—As Chair Clayton Suggested,
COOLEY PUBCO (Mar. 25, 2019), https://cooleypubco.com/2019/03/25/
mandatory-arbitration-shareholder-proposal-complaint [https://perma.cc/PT2R-
CVFV].  The issue in the Johnson & Johnson case, discussed id., is the arbitration of
federal securities claims, but very similar rationales (i.e., power and information
asymmetries precluding actual “consent,” and the unique suitability of court-based
24
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Finally, recent scholarship has turned to the topic of alternatives to
corporations, including common law trusts,124 reciprocal insurance ex-
changes,125 and security interests.126  These works confront a basic ques-
tion: why “corporate law” and not trust law, contract law, or property law,
respectively?  Why cannot natural persons enter into highly complex, mul-
tilateral legal relationships, with help from non-corporate law concepts,
such as “constructive notice” and “agency?”
The answer is that they can, but it would be so costly and inconve-
nient that a relationship with an entity—a corporation—is vastly prefera-
ble.  Each of the frameworks discussed in these articles offer some
advantages, making them more useful than corporate law in some situa-
tions.  Yet, neither trusts, nor reciprocal contracts, nor security interests
offer all the benefits of a corporation, or do so in the very wide, flexible range
of situations which the corporation is fit to address.
For example, Verstein’s discussion of reciprocal insurance makes
clear that such arrangements are highly repetitive: the “attorney-in-fact”—
the natural person who signs new contracts, receives premium payments,
and distributes insurance benefits to a large number of subscribers127—
basically does that, and not much else.  The attorney-in-fact is bound by
the terms of the contracts with each insured party.  These are insurance,
not trade, manufacturing, or anything-else contracts.  Attorneys-in-fact
cannot, in their role as such, enter into new activities, as they have far less
than the general, unlimited legal capacity of a corporation.  The same is
true of any contract: the agreement has some terms and boundaries; it does
not say “do whatever you wish.”128
Yet, one type of legal instrument—corporations’ constitutional docu-
ments—says precisely that, and is predicated on the corporation’s general
capacity to act as a person.  Put simply, can anyone imagine Google oper-
procedures for resolving corporate law disputes) apply in regard to internal affairs,
state law claims.
124. See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in
Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145 (2016).
125. See Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247
(2017).
126. See Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring Distinction Between Busi-
ness Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (2019).
127. For a description of reciprocal insurance exchanges’ basic structure, see
Verstein, supra note 125, at 264–66.
128. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 117, at 279 n.91 (“[T]he requirement of defi-
niteness is not a matter that the parties can waive if they are to have a contract.
Indeed, it is tautological to argue that the parties can agree to an indefinite level of
performance, since there cannot be an agreement if parties do not know to what
they have agreed.”).  Some contracts might seem to be saying something similar to
“do whatever you wish”—for example, a lawyer’s retainer agreement or a physi-
cian’s medical care agreement—but even they are constrained by certain positive
law frameworks: legal ethics and medical ethics, respectively, along with general
fiduciary law.  In contrast, the corporation is not necessarily anyone’s fiduciary; it is
constrained only by corporate law’s imperative to pursue its purpose.
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ating not as a corporate entity, but as a web of reciprocal contracts among
billions of consumers, employees, managers and others?  Quite clearly not.
The existence of a central party, having its own rights, duties, identity and
traits, and surviving the death (or other disability, or just change of mind)
of any natural person, enables something special to happen.  Google, like
most corporations, engages in a host of dynamic acts and relationships,
undefined—and to a large extent, unimaginable—by anyone in advance.
This can only be achieved through corporate law, with its concept of per-
sonhood and its open-ended, equity-based dictates.129
It is no surprise, then, that Eldar and Verstein describe business enti-
ties as “enduring” in their article title, and conclude, “the species of entity
. . . will survive long after [other categories in private law have]
dissolved.”130
C. The Corporation’s Stakeholders
Theoretically, it is possible for a corporation not to have non-residual
claimants (in this Article referred to as “stakeholders”131).  A corporation
might be established, with its shareholders conveying to it some property;
beyond that, the corporation would engage in no other contract or rela-
tionship.  However, such a scenario, if it occurs at all, is exceedingly rare.
Practically, almost every corporation has stakeholders.  Corporations are
usually meant to carry out activities more complex than individuals can
effectively achieve; in turn, this gives rise to relationships with various
stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, financial creditors, and many
others.  Therefore, a complete theory of corporate law should have some-
129. Even the common law of trusts, see Morley, supra note 124, while
grounded in equity, offers less than corporate law’s combination of flexibility and
certainty.  For instance, “[t]rust law had always allowed a trust to persist after the
death, disappearance, or change of a beneficiary,” id. at 2194, but what about the
death or disappearance of a trustee?  Even if trust law did try to resolve these various
conundrums, the litigation and uncertainty costs surrounding them would be
much higher than those afforded by the widespread understanding of the corpora-
tion’s nature as a separate and enduring person.  Furthermore, trust law does not
provide the same open-ended, “any lawful act or activity” imperative as corporate
law, see supra note 22.  Instead, a trust relationship has an ex ante information
“anchor” in the form of trust property, for the loss of which the trustee is subject to
legal sanction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) (“A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property in exis-
tence . . . .”), 5 cmt. a(2) (“In any event, and often crucial in determining the
character of a relationship, there can be no trust without identifiable trust prop-
erty.”), 100 (“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with . . . the
amount required to restore the values of the trust estate . . . or . . . the amount of
any benefit to the trustee personally as a result of the breach.”).  Consequently,
trust law cannot facilitate the same range of unpredictable adventures as corporate
law.  The trustee’s actions are more constrained before-the-fact, compared to those
of a corporation; as a result, corporate law generates a much wider potential for
both risk and reward.
130. Eldar & Verstein, supra note 126, at 269.
131. See supra note 23.
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thing to say about stakeholders: what kind of rights and duties do they
have?  Which areas of law provide the tools to resolve the questions per-
taining to them?
As is typical in the present-day dichotomy of corporate law,
shareholderists and stakeholderists have different answers.  To start with,
many shareholderists follow a mode of thinking, quite common in the
U.S., which can be summarized as: “If it’s not happening in the headlines,
it’s not happening.”132  Accordingly, they concentrate on one term—”con-
tract”—to describe the innumerably diverse set of relationships a corpora-
tion might have with its stakeholders.  For example, in a 2009 article,
Judge Easterbrook broadly posits that “[i]n all of this there are no third-
party effects.  Competition and contracts promote efficiency . . . .  Stran-
gers to the finance and governance bargain, such as debt investors and
labor, arrange their affairs by their own contracts. . . .  [F]ree contracting
in a competitive system just has to promote everyone’s welfare.”133  This
sort of “headline” writing ignores the wide array of frameworks that com-
prise positive law (such as employment law, torts, environmental law,
trusts, fiduciary law, unjust enrichment, general equity, and so on, along-
side contract law), which binds every person, including corporations, and
which often has very little to do with “contract,” or any ex ante, bargained-
for set of choices.
In reality, there are “third-party effects,” power and information asym-
metries, and need for equity and nuance.  An employment relationship is
different than that between lender and borrower in the LIBOR market.134
The law pierces many veils; yet, we can never pierce law itself.  Thus, a
more accurate choice of words than “contract” would be “positive law.”  By
definition, no one is allowed to commit an unlawful act.135  Equally, it is
132. Chris William Sanchirico, Win or Lose on Amazon, Philly Needs to Get
Smart About Attracting New Businesses, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 25, 2017), https://
www.inquirer.com/philly/opinion/commentary/amazon-hq2-philadelphia-
business-kenney-20171025.html [https://perma.cc/PGV9-YJGG].
133. Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 690.
134. Indeed, employment relationships generally form a large part of peo-
ple’s lives and identity, and give rise to many troubling issues. See, e.g., Milja
Milenkovic, 42 Worrying Workplace Stress Statistics, AM. INST. OF STRESS (Sept. 23,
2019), https://www.stress.org/42-worrying-workplace-stress-statistics [https://
perma.cc/9W3Z-Q5FE] (citing studies showing, among other things, that “[o]ver a
third of people said their job was a regular source of stress in 2018,” and that this
stress can often be attributed to specific, employer-dependent causes, such as
“poor communication practices by . . . employers” and “a heavy workload”).
135. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Agency, Authority, and Compliance, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij eds.,
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3462638 [https://perma.cc/QM8X-GM3H] (“Law is what you must
do—the rules and regulations originating from the sovereign, transgression of
which may lead to deprivation of property or, in some cases, liberty.”).  Addition-
ally, within corporate law, many cases establish that a corporation is never permit-
ted to act unlawfully (even to achieve profit), and its fiduciaries violate their duties
if they cause it to do so. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
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not possible to impose a legal sanction for a lawful act.  Law is imperfect,
but it can be reformed—which requires going through the democratic,
judicial, or regulatory process, and cannot consist of someone subjectively
“declaring” that a certain behavior is right or wrong.136  It is not always
easy to ascertain what positive law says, but it does say something, and does
not say anything anyone might wish for.137
Furthermore, the corporation’s relationships with its stakeholders are
such that a natural person might also enter (albeit often on a different
scale).  Both a corporation and a human can borrow money, have employ-
ees, or purchase goods and services.  As a result, it is general, non-corporate
law that provides the vast majority of norms governing corporations (and
anyone else).  The corporation’s obligations toward its employees or finan-
cial creditors are external to corporate law.  Legal or contractual changes
to those relationships do not modify corporate law.  Rather, those obliga-
tions are subsumed, as a whole, into the definitional requirement that the
corporation act lawfully.  Anything that happens within corporate law—
including the rights of residual claimants—happens only after that re-
quirement is satisfied.138
This fact—that non-corporate law regulates the corporation’s rela-
tionships with its stakeholders—has been firmly established in U.S. law
since at least 1877, when the Supreme Court decided Munn v. Illinois.139
There, an “unincorporated” company (a corporation140 not “chartered”
by the state) challenged a price regulation on the grounds that, lacking a
state-issued charter, the state has no power to tell the company how to run
an aspect of its business.  Rejecting this argument, Chief Justice Waite
found that any business “affected with a public interest”141 may be publicly
regulated.  In other words, regulation of corporations’ effect on the public
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (foundational Delaware case on the issue); Marchand v.
Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No.
2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); In re Massey
Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS
83, at *73–74 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“Delaware law allows corporations to pur-
sue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the
requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue ‘lawful business’ by ‘lawful
acts.’  As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Dela-
ware corporation by knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.” (foot-
note omitted)); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 2013, 2017 (2019) (“Delaware courts have prioritized giving directors broad
latitude to take business risk by drawing a line at legal risk . . . .” (emphasis added)).
136. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 790.
137. See supra note 24 (discussing the meaning of positive law).
138. See Raz, supra note 1, at 275–76 (“[T]he residual interests . . . [are] those
left after all corporate obligations, of any kind, to all non-residual claimants are
satisfied, in practice or in capacity.”); see also id. at 274 n.77 (explaining how both
corporate and non-corporate law operationalize this ever-present requirement).
139. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
140. On the broad meaning of “corporation” as used in this Article, see supra
note 1.
141. Munn, 94 U.S. at 130.
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is not within the realm of corporate law; it does not flow from the corpora-
tion’s constitutional documents.  Rather, it is part of general law, which
applies to both corporations and natural persons.142
More recently, a leading figure of global corporate law went on to
express the same idea: according to Chief Justice Strine, “[a] corporate
law case is not a case about all laws, but about a law.  We are not environ-
ment protection law, labor law or antitrust law—you stay in your lane.”143
Strine advocates the same theme in a long series of scholarly articles,144
making clear that protecting stakeholders against externalities, while cer-
tainly lacking in the U.S. and around the world, is not part of corporate law.
Strine specifically concludes that “if interests such as the environment,
workers, and consumers are to be protected, then what is required is a
revival of effective externality regulation that gives these interests more
effective and timely protection,”145 contrasting “externality regulation”
with norms “within corporation law itself.”146  Other scholars have made
this point in various contexts,147 and a recent article by Professor Mariana
Pargendler “raises the possibility that the promise of corporate govern-
ance may have been overrated, . . . [as it] may crowd out potentially more
effective responses to the problems at hand.”148
The inherent difference, in structural terms, between corporate and
non-corporate law is the result of at least two factors.  First, corporate law
involves different actors.  The terms “corporation,” “shareholder,” and “di-
rector” result exclusively from the corporate framework.  There can be no
142. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1628–32 (1988) (discussing Munn and the other
Granger cases; noting that “Munn had been selected for a full opinion on state
power to regulate prices because the company was unincorporated,” that the
Court in these cases “[upheld] rate regulation of natural persons provided the
regulated market was ‘affected with the public interest,’” and that “Munn . . . made
corporate status irrelevant to the states’ power to regulate rates”).
143. Rita K. Farrell, At Top of Delaware Chancery Court, Adherence to Tradition,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/at-top-of-
delaware-chancery-court-adherence-to-tradition [https://perma.cc/7V5Z-4TT7]
(interviewing then-Chancellor Strine).
144. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence
from My Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 177 (2017) [hereinafter
Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Strug-
gle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135,
145–46, 171–72 (2012); Strine, supra note 8, at 768, 786–93.
145. Strine, supra note 8, at 793.
146. Id. at 768.
147. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New
Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 328 (2001) (“Laws offering models for
business organizations . . . cover relationships between the interested parties within the
organizations . . . .  None of these laws, however, regulates the businesses in which the
organizations engage.  Those . . . businesses are regulated by other laws, unrelated to
[their] organizational structures . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-
Organization Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751 (2005).
148. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L.
359, 402 (2016).
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director for a natural person; and, while a natural person does in some
sense have “residual claimants”—the person’s presumptive heirs149—they
have no legal standing during the person’s life, in terms of setting a pur-
pose, appointing fiduciaries, or any of the rights granted to shareholders.
Thus, special norms150 are required to regulate the relationships gener-
ated by the corporate framework, but not other relationships, which
equally attach to natural and corporate persons.
Second, corporate law differs from non-corporate law in the informa-
tion content of the legal norms.  Every legal field provides some set of im-
peratives.  The command might be detailed (“pay $100 to the bondholder
on July 1”) or undetailed (“act equitably with the trust property”), but it
exists.  Corporate law, in contrast, provides the most undetailed guidance
of all: it simply tells the corporation to “do whatever.”  A corporation can
literally act however it wishes, subject to only one imperative: “lawfully pur-
sue profit” (or any other purpose, depending on the type of corpora-
tion).151  Among other issues, this makes corporate law entirely unsuitable
to govern the substantive rights and duties of anyone other than the actors
affected by the open-ended part (“pursue profit”)—that is, the corpora-
tion, its residual claimants, and its fiduciaries—as opposed to those af-
fected by the close-ended part (“lawfully”), that is, stakeholders.
Crucially, attempting to set stakeholders’ rights within corporate law
would actually place stakeholders in an inferior position, compared to what
they have today.  That is because non-corporate law, with its more specific
and information-rich content, provides both better rights and better en-
forcement.  Legal actors need information to know (and act on) their
rights and duties.  Trying to enforce stakeholders’ rights within corporate
law would generate an extreme information asymmetry, between the
wished-for, subjective demands—nowhere found in positive law—of various
stakeholders, and what the corporation can know it is obliged to do, ascer-
tainable through law.152  This asymmetry is absolute and inevitable.  Even
149. See Raz, supra note 1, at 274–75.
150. Moreover, special mechanisms are required to enforce those norms, such
as the derivative action, which is a unique creature of corporate law.  The distinc-
tion between derivative and direct actions has far-reaching implications. See, e.g.,
id. at 295 n.159.
151. See supra Section I.A; supra note 22.  This point is embodied in the fact
that the corporation’s goals might be “to engage in any lawful act or activity.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2020).
152. The same holds true if the “do whatever (in the lawful pursuit of profit)”
imperative is augmented with seemingly more specific language, which actually
does nothing to resolve the asymmetry described here.  One example is saying that
the corporation must promote “general public benefit.”  Accountable Capitalism
Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).  By design, law cannot provide any guide or
imperative to operationalize this abstract requirement.  Imposing such a “duty”
assumes law away, replacing it with after-the-fact, subjective determination of
whether the corporation acted “right” or “wrong.”  Among other issues, this kind
of legislation might violate the constitutional vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, The Void for Vagueness / Fair Notice Doctrine and Civil Cases, VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (June 21, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/06/21/the-void-for-
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if the corporation could somehow read stakeholders’ minds, there would
still be no logical way to say that the lawful is unlawful.  The only way to
align the corporation’s duties with stakeholders’ interests, in a legally en-
forceable way, is to change the law.  That happens all the time, in legisla-
tures, courts, regulatory agencies, and private agreements.  Still, if existing
law sets the minimum wage at x, it simply is not 2x, or 0.5x, unless the law
is changed.  Working to improve non-corporate law would be more fruit-
ful in both achieving desired societal goals, and not disturbing the equity-
based structure of corporate law.
Accordingly, statements that corporate law should promote “the ag-
gregate welfare of all who are affected by a firm’s activities,”153 “overall
social welfare,”154 or “cooperative economic activity”155 must be under-
stood in context.  They are not a recipe for arbitrariness.  Promotion of
social welfare does not entail creating “rights” (at cost to others) out of
whole cloth.  Rather, it means maximizing involved actors’ welfare, so that
claims are initially allocated in a just and efficient manner, and each of the
actors then receive their full legal claim.
Consistent with the purpose-based structure of corporate law, it is also
true that stakeholders’ interests, beyond their current positive law claims,
may be considered by the corporation, to the extent such consideration
advances the corporation’s purpose.  Among other cases,156 Paramount v.
Time provides a perfect example.  Time’s “journalistic integrity”157 is a
value it voluntarily adopted, under no legal obligation to do so.  None of
Time’s stakeholders have a legal claim to the preservation of “Time Cul-
ture.”158  Non-corporate law, including the First Amendment,159 permits
vagueness-fair-notice-doctrine-and-civil-cases [https://perma.cc/2AQ5-PXRQ]
(surveying case law applying the constitutional vagueness doctrine in administra-
tive law and other civil contexts; noting that the doctrine “is applicable to cases
that involve civil penalties and not just criminal liability”).
153. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 22.
154. Id. at 23.
155. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 343 (5th ed. 2016).  For a similar statement,
see William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 714
(2014) (“[B]usiness corporations exist to create wealth . . . .”).  To complete this
kind of argument, one should ask: whose wealth does a corporation create?  The
corporation’s (similar to natural persons, entitled to the fruit of their efforts, sub-
ject to meeting all legal obligations).  How do we know what legal claims other
people have toward the corporation?  Through law.
156. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(refusing to interfere in a corporation’s decision not to install lights in a stadium,
an expansion which allegedly would have led to higher revenue from nighttime
games; reasoning that the decision, which considered “the effect on the surround-
ing neighborhood,” might promote the “long run [economic] interest” of the
corporation).
157. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Del.
1989).
158. Id. passim.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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anyone to engage in publishing that lacks integrity.160  Yet, in the face of a
hostile takeover attempt, Time was allowed to defend this value, because it
promoted the corporation’s purpose—the lawful pursuit of profit.161
The legal response to an extremely significant national crisis—the
opioid epidemic—provides a perfect illustration of the framework dis-
cussed here.  In December 2018, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio denied pharmaceutical defendants’ motions to
dismiss the consolidated civil action filed against them.162  As the decision
shows, the defendants are the pharmaceutical corporations themselves, as sep-
arate legal persons—not their shareholders, employees, or fiduciaries.163
It is the corporation, having the same capacity as a natural person, that
dealt with the victims, and should pay for their injuries.  Furthermore,
none of the causes of action have anything to do with corporate law: the
plaintiffs seek remedies arising in such areas as tort law and unjust enrich-
ment; they were injured not as a corporation or shareholders, but as pa-
tients, consumers, family members, and public service providers.  If a
natural person committed the same acts the corporations are being sued
for, the case would look no different.
Moreover, if we somehow tried to apply corporate law in this case, it
would provide “null results”: nothing within corporate law tells the phar-
maceutical corporations whether their opioid marketing practices are le-
gally permissible.  Attempting to rely on corporate law, or even a more
“socialized” version thereof, would yield worse outcomes for the victims:
the corporations could simply claim that they acted in furtherance of
“general public benefit,”164 and any court proceeding would focus on in-
terpreting that ambiguous phrase, rather than utilize the much more spe-
cific, information-rich tools of tort law and the other causes of action,
developed over centuries of jurisprudence.
160. Again, within the bounds of positive law.  Defamation, for example, is
prohibited.  Yet, there are many kinds of lawful publishing that lack integrity—see
your closest tabloid.
161. See Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[Directors’] broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action . . . designed to
enhance corporate profitability.”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos.
10866, 10670, 10935 (Consol.), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *22–86 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989) (“[T]here is insufficient basis to suppose at this juncture that such con-
cerns [for the ‘Time culture’] have caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their
duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation . . . .
[W]here the board . . . continues to manage the corporation for long-term
profit . . . , the corporation has a legally cognizable interest in achieving that
plan.”), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
162. County of Summit v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (In re Nat’l Prescription Opi-
ate Litig.), No. 1:17-md-2804, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213657 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19,
2018).
163. See id. at *1–55 (listing the parties in the case; indicating that the vast
majority of defendants are corporations, while the few natural persons listed as
defendants are, according to a separate web search, physicians and pharmacists,
not related to a corporate defendant).
164. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
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Despite all this, many stakeholderists do not believe that a corpora-
tion meeting all of its legal obligations has done enough; they argue it
should still potentially be subject to legal sanction.  Aiming to somehow
import stakeholders’ claims into corporate law, they wish to transform the
corporation’s purpose from the lawful pursuit of its own benefit to an al-
truistic endeavor.  The final paragraphs of this Section consider several
important arguments to that effect.
At the outset, we sometimes encounter foggy metaphors, such as re-
ferring to stakeholders as if they are “constituent parts” of the corpora-
tion.165  Such physiological allusions are without merit, since the
corporation is a person—one entity, not “composed” of anyone else.166
Corporations are no more made up of shareholders and stakeholders than
natural persons are composed of the bank that holds their account and
the college to which they pay tuition.  Moreover, placing the corporation’s
fiduciaries in the center, and expecting them to divide their loyalties
among multiple stakeholders, shifts the focus away from where it is due:
the corporation itself, which is the beneficiary of its fiduciaries’ duties, and
the person serving as stakeholders’ counterparty.  As has been correctly
argued,167 such pluralization of fiduciaries’ duties only amounts to a grant
of unchecked power to fiduciaries, while producing little, or negative, ben-
efits for both the corporation, stakeholders, and shareholders.  In reality,
as described in this Section, what corporations have with their stakehold-
ers is an array of legal relationships, governed by legal norms.
Even when recognizing this, stakeholderists often fail to locate the
correct sphere in which to pursue desirable reforms: non-corporate law.
Rather, they call for ambiguous “corporate social responsibility” (CSR),
overlooking the central questions: how does the corporation—or anyone
else—objectively know what is socially responsible?  Even assuming that
“socially responsible” represents some better standard of conduct than
165. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 155, at 284 (“To whom do direc-
tors owe loyalty?  The short answer is that they owe their duty to the corporation as
a legal entity.  Yet . . . [t]he ‘corporation’ has multiple constituencies with conflict-
ing interests, including stockholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, and custom-
ers.  To say that directors owe loyalty to the corporation masks conflicts among
these constituencies.” (footnote omitted)).  However, that is not the “short” answer
but the accurate one; the corporation should not be placed in quote marks; stake-
holders do not “constitute” the corporation, but exist separately from it and from
one another; and their mutual conflicts (or, more commonly, their conflicts with
the corporation) should be resolved according to law (as opposed to directors’
guesswork), just like other disputes among people.
166. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 285–87 (explaining why “aggregate” theo-
ries of the corporation are incorrect); supra Section I.B.
167. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch.
2013) (“[A] multivariate fiduciary calculus quickly devolves into the equitable
equivalent of a constituency statute with a concomitant decline in accountabil-
ity.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
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“lawful,” how can legal institutions enforce that standard, when by defini-
tion, no legal sanction can be imposed for lawful behavior?
Recent scholarship168 has gone so far as to condemn governments for
doing precisely the right thing: regulating corporations through stronger,
clearer statements of positive law.  Instead, that article mysteriously de-
mands an overriding reliance on “CSR.”169  Proposals of this kind effec-
tively seek to turn corporations and their fiduciaries into omnipotent
private lawmakers, arbitrarily creating and enforcing their own rules as to
what is “responsible.”  The concept of law does not work this way.
Another line of argument is that, in essence, shareholders are stake-
holders.  Greenwood,170 Hart and Zingales,171 and Strine,172 to cite three
leading examples, correctly note that shareholders, in addition to the rela-
tionship they have with the corporation under share law, might often be
employees, consumers, or people otherwise affected by corporate actions.
Presumably, even under a “shareholder-oriented” view, corporate law
should therefore tend to the stakeholderist side.
This argument, however, looks under the wrong lamppost.  To begin
with, as this Article proves extensively, corporate law is not, cannot, and
should not be about shareholder primacy; rather, the corporation—sepa-
rate from its shareholders, and not meant to serve any of them individu-
ally173—is at the heart of corporate law, which aims to facilitate the pursuit
of the corporation’s own purpose.
Second, and more fundamentally, people engage in a variety of differ-
ent relationships with one another.  A dentist might also be a psychologist,
but a patient coming for a root canal does not expect marriage advice, and
vice versa.  Even if some patient did receive both treatments, each is gov-
erned by a separate contract or legal framework, and requires the doctor
to engage in a separate decision-making process (and, hopefully, not per-
form both at the same time).  Similarly, a shareholder might also be an
168. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Respon-
sibility in an Era of Globalization and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167
(2018).
169. Id. passim.
170. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
171. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Wel-
fare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017).
172. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Per-
spective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870 (2017).
173. This is important in the context of the “shareholders are stakeholders”
argument, since different shareholders have diverging interests, both as sharehold-
ers and, certainly, as stakeholders.  One shareholder is an employee, but another is
not.  Even two shareholder-employees might experience different outcomes from
the same corporate action.  The fine-grained treatment offered by separate
fields—corporate law and non-corporate employment law—is far more capable of
handling the fine-grained distinctions between different people in varying
situations.
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/2
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 557
employee and a consumer, but these are three distinct relationships, each
handled within a different toolbox, or set of legal norms (corporate law,
employment law and consumer protection law).  In fact, because shares
are residual claims, that shareholder is first and foremost an employee and a
consumer.  The corporation must meet all of its obligations under non-
corporate law before the shareholder as such can see any benefit.  Thus,
the “shareholders are stakeholders” argument does not add much to the
corporate law debate, since stakeholders are already as protected as possible
under non-corporate law.174
In summary, stakeholderists raise many valid arguments regarding the
shortcomings of existing law.  Very often, the protections afforded to em-
ployees, consumers, lenders, or the environment might be suboptimal.
Within the legal sphere, there is one way to deal with that: going through
the legal process to refine positive, binding law.  We ought to fix the law
where such reforms would be effective; we should not throw simplistic
statements into a toolbox incapable of handling them,175 hoping that cor-
porate directors (of all people)176 would somehow save the day.  As Profes-
sor Kent Greenfield observes, “corporations are people too (and they
should act like it).”177  This also means that no extra-legal, subjective
“norms,” conveyed in whichever three-letter acronym favored by a given
commentator,178 somehow bind corporations and not others.  The correct
three letters are “law.”
D. The Corporation’s Residual Claimants
Every corporation, at any given moment, has at least one residual
claimant.  As a previous article explains, “[t]he underlying reason for this
is that a corporation’s life can end . . . .  When that happens, the corpora-
tion’s interests . . . do not disappear. . . .  [O]nly rarely, if ever, do a corpo-
ration’s interests precisely equal its liabilities. . . .  [The] person entitled to
receive the difference, or ‘residual[,]’ . . . is the residual claimant.”179  Ad-
174. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52.
175. See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018)
(requiring that corporations act to further “general public benefit”).
176. See Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose, supra note 144, at 177 (“Pre-
tending that corporate boards—an odd recourse for ordinary people anyway—are
to be looked at as a source of protection and solace for workers, the environment,
and consumers dilutes the focus that is actually needed, which is on the protec-
tions from externalities that other constituencies deserve.”).
177. KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD
ACT LIKE IT) (2018).
178. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Purpose: ESG, CSR, PRI and Sustainable
Long-Term Investment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 4,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/04/corporate-purpose-esg-csr-
pri-and-sustainable-long-term-investment [https://perma.cc/RFC7-YSNM].
179. Raz, supra note 1, at 272–73.  As a result, even nonprofit corporations
have residual claimants.  The question “who would be entitled to receive the cor-
poration’s residual?” might sometimes be decided ex post (in the case of nonprofit
corporations, this would usually entail dedicating the residual to similar goals as
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ditionally, residual claimants play a crucial role at the opposite end of the
corporation’s life cycle: by default, they are the people who establish the
corporation, providing corporate law with entities to govern in the first
place.180  The question, then, is what is a residual claim?  What kind of
rights does a shareholder (or “member,” or “partner”) have, toward
whom, and governed by which legal framework?
A well-liked children’s toy consists of a box with an internal array of
mirrors, into which coins can be inserted.  When the user opens the top of
the box, the coin is nowhere to be found.  Only by following a certain
process, which requires accessing a hidden compartment, can the user re-
trieve the economic value stored in the box.  The structure of corporate
law places shareholders in a similar position.  The coin (shareholders’ eq-
uitable claim) always exists, but so does the box (the corporation).  Only
by going through the process (corporate law, and none else) may the
shareholder see any benefit.
What makes shares and shareholders’ rights so special is that they can-
not be explained by any legal framework other than corporate law; and
even within corporate law, nuances apply.  Allen and Kraakman put it sim-
ply: “[Shareholders] have no right to any periodic payment, nor can they
demand the return of their investment from the corporation.  Nor . . . can
they typically tell the firm’s managers what to do.”181  Thus, neither con-
tract law nor agency law govern shares.  From many additional aspects,
shareholders are not mere contractual parties.182  Other common “meta-
phors” are also misguided: as this Article demonstrates, the corporation is
an unownable person; and the corporation—not shareholders—is the
owner of its property.  Shareholders only own their shares (which are bun-
dles of rights toward, not “in” the corporation); the “property” or “investor
ownership” metaphors are empty vessels.183  Furthermore, shareholders
are not trust beneficiaries,184 or (the view most common in the U.S.) di-
rect beneficiaries of the corporation’s directors and officers under fiduci-
ary law.185  As a rule, fiduciaries’ duties run to the corporate person, not
to shareholders (or anyone else).  Moreover, the corporation’s interests
might diverge from those of shareholders, or part of them.186  Thus, even
within corporate law, share law is distinct from corporate fiduciary law.
The former deals primarily with the corporation’s obligations to share-
holders, and the latter—with fiduciaries’ obligations to the corporation.
those of the dissolving corporation), but in any case, some person would receive the
residual assets.
180. See id. at 273.
181. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 155, at 143.
182. See Raz, supra note 1, at 282–85.
183. See id. at 285–87.
184. See id. at 287–90.
185. See id. at 290–301.
186. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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As a result, the law of shares is not founded on concepts of contract,
agency, property, trust, or fiduciary law.  Rather, the basis of shareholders’
rights—quite simply, the answer to the question “why do shares have
value?”—resides in a concept of equity.187  The various “agency problems”
between the corporation and its shareholders are resolved with equitable
(but mostly non-fiduciary) tools, such as the law of share dilution, divi-
dends and buybacks, appraisal rights, shareholder voting, books and
records inspection, shareholder litigation, and other mechanisms.188
Nuance is key here: shareholders have lesser standing than fiduciary
law principals, and do not own the corporation or its property.  Yet, this
does not mean they are “merely owners of . . . certain contractual
claims.”189  The residual nature of shares makes them anything but cer-
tain.190  Shareholders’ “contract” with the corporation (its constitutional
documents) might, at most, resemble a contract, for specific purposes and
in some cases.  In fact, corporate charters and bylaws can better be de-
scribed as equity documents.  They rely on unwaivable legal and equitable
constructs, meant to respond to the problems generated by corporate
law’s power- and information-asymmetric nature.191
Importantly, the non-fiduciary nature of shareholders’ rights has an
exception.  Most of the time, whatever effect fiduciaries have on share-
holders is channeled through the corporation.  Yet, in some situations,
shareholders might gain a direct claim toward the corporation’s fiducia-
ries.  This exception only occurs in “a limited set of circumstances,”192
when the channeling principle is violated, and the fiduciary action at issue
does not materially affect the corporation itself.  That happens, for exam-
ple, in Revlon mode,193 when fiduciaries directly control the fate of share-
holders’ investment, while the corporation, nearing a “breakup,”194 has
187. See Raz, supra note 1, at 302–11.  Note that fiduciary law and equity are
not the same.  Fiduciary law is one branch of equity.  A person (such as a share-
holder) can have equitable rights, while not being owed fiduciary duties. See id. at
294–95, 303–05; supra note 98.  For a detailed illustration of equity as a distinct
concept from fiduciary law, and share law as grounded in non-fiduciary equity, see
Paul B. Miller, Equity, Majoritarian Governance, and the Oppression Remedy, in FIDUCI-
ARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur B. Laby & Jacob Hale Russell eds., forth-
coming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483563
[https://perma.cc/5FB9-HW94].
188. See Raz, supra note 1, at 311–19.
189. Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 483.
190. See Raz, supra note 1, at 276–78, 282–85, 308–09.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 117–23.
192. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989).
193. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (“[Once the company was for sale,] [t]he duty of the board had
. . . changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximiza-
tion of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit. . . .  The direc-
tors’ role[, before the company was for sale, was to serve as] defenders of the
corporate bastion . . . .”).
194. Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
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no skin in the game.  Other violations of the channeling principle can
occur.195  Again, these are special cases—particularly considering that
most corporations, most of the time, are a “going concern,” not in Revlon
mode, and not at the end of their lives.
Today, both shareholderists and stakeholderists tend to characterize
all corporate law in terms of fiduciary duties (to shareholders or others),
thus overlooking either the corporation’s personhood, or the principles of
fiduciary law, which require “single-minded” dedication to the beneficiary
(the corporation).196  The mischaracterization of all corporate law as fidu-
ciary law, and of shareholders as fiduciary law beneficiaries, generates sub-
tle faults with many practical consequences.  For example, while discussing
the case of Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,197 Professor Mark Ramseyer
comments that “[t]he opinion makes no sense . . . .  If the one [share-
holder] owed the three [other shareholders] a fiduciary duty, the three
owed the one the same.”198  In fact, the opinion makes a lot of sense, once
we recognize that neither shareholder owed the others a “fiduciary” duty;
rather, as controlling shareholders, they owed their duties to the corpora-
tion.199  Despite using less-than-optimal language, the court correctly held
the one dissenting shareholder, who prevented a distribution and thereby
caused the corporation to pay higher taxes, to have breached his fiduciary
obligations.
On the flip side, a more recent Massachusetts case illustrates the grave
outcomes a misreading of corporate law’s structure and nuances can bring
for shareholders as such.  Initially, 2017’s International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Local No. 129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci200 decision seems to cohere
with the framework presented in this Article: as the court says, “the gen-
eral rule of Massachusetts corporate law is that a director of a Massachu-
setts corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, and not its
shareholders.”201  So far, so good, but in this case, the exception discussed
above applies; a channeling principle issue arose.  The facts in this case
are akin to Revlon mode: the question was whether directors acted to maxi-
mize the value of shareholders’ shares—not the corporation’s assets—when
195. See Raz, supra note 1, at 299 n.168.
196. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is
elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those
whose interests the fiduciary is to protect. . . .  [A] fiduciary . . . is bound to single-
mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 533,
[1998] Ch 1, 18 (appeal taken from Eng.) (a globally cited case on fiduciary law
principles, stating that “[t]he principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of
his fiduciary”).
197. 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
198. J. Mark Ramseyer, Introduction, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 1, 1 (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009).
199. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 297 n.164; infra Section II.A.
200. 70 N.E.3d 918 (Mass. 2017).
201. Id. at 926.
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they carried out a merger that forfeited those shares from their owners.  In
this scenario, as Delaware law correctly and equitably recognizes, directors
become ad hoc fiduciaries for shareholders.
The Tucci court, however, chose to forego a substantive, structural
(and economic) inquiry of corporate law, instead formalistically focusing
on two exceptions found in case law, neither of which apply here.202  The
court says that “undervaluing [the corporation] to secure the merger . . .
qualifies as a direct injury to the corporation”203—but how, exactly?  None
of the corporation’s assets changed hands; only shareholders’ stake was
affected.  The corporation is also not the sum of its shareholders. Tucci
begins with a correct statement of corporate personhood and fiduciary
law, but then essentially devolves into an “aggregate” view of the corpora-
tion.  The court affirms the dismissal of the case, reasoning that it should
have been filed as a derivative, rather than direct, action.204 Tucci is one
example, among many in this Article, of an under-recognition of corpo-
rate law’s anatomy, possibly leading to large-scale wealth transfers (in this
case, from public shareholders to an acquiring party), with no economic
or legal justification.205
Some jurisdictions, particularly Delaware, tend to use phrases such as
“fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”206  If that ex-
pression is to be harmonized with the mass of other sources—including
from Delaware itself—surveyed throughout this Article, it can only be con-
strued as “duties to the corporation, which in turn owes equitable duties to
shareholders.”207  Delaware’s dualistic language might best be understood
as a form of reminder: not about fiduciary duties (which run solely to the
corporation), but about the corporation’s purpose, which is the lawful pur-
suit of profit.  That profit—ultimately (meaning a potentially unlimited
time), and only through the facts of corporate law (such as the corpora-
tion’s power to decide whether or not it distributes a dividend or makes a
share buyback; its fiduciaries’ ability to enact defensive tactics against a




204. See id. at 928.  Note that precisely because plaintiffs’ shares were taken
from them in the merger, they can no longer file a derivative action.
205. “Dell agreed to acquire all of EMC for approximately $67 billion.” Id. at
921–22.  If the case was not dismissed at the pleading stage, the parties would have
had the chance to prove whether or not that amount is adequate.
206. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993)
(“[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); Crescent/
Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Directors
have an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
the stockholders alike.”).
207. See Raz, supra note 1, at 293–95.  This point is also supported by Dela-
ware’s Trados case. See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
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There is also a deeper relation between share law and the law of cor-
porate purpose.  If an attempt was made to change a corporation’s pur-
pose without the due consent of its residual claimants,208 those claimants’
rights would be fundamentally affected, if not completely eliminated.  The
residual claim inherently depends on a certain assumption as to the corpo-
ration’s purpose; the pursuit of that purpose, by the corporation, is what
generates the value of the residual claim (albeit only ultimately and indi-
rectly).  When a for-profit corporation is required to cease lawfully pursu-
ing profit, or to distribute its current assets to stakeholders, irrespective of
their pre-existing positive law rights, this clearly negates the very content
of shareholders’ residual claim.  Therefore, in addition to the corporation
itself, residual claimants might have standing to challenge such attempts.
In other words, residual claimants have, as part of their equitable claim, a
right to have the corporation’s purpose remain what it is.209  Since the
corporation’s purpose must always be lawful,210 this does not impinge
upon the rights of anyone else.  By definition, the pursuit of profit, or any
other purpose, may not be subject to legal incursion, if it is made in full
accordance with law.
In summary, the structure of corporate law entails that residual claim-
ants—shareholders, members, or any other moniker attached to those
whose claim toward the corporation is defined solely by the phrase “what
is left after all obligations to other stakeholders are met”—do not “own”
the corporate person or its assets; are not directly owed duties by its fiduci-
aries; and have interests that might diverge from those of the corporation,
and from each other’s.  Yet, the residual nature of their claim, negating any
attempt to fully rely on ex ante, “contract”-based planning, also means
208. Senator Warren’s proposed Accountable Capitalism Act represents such
an attempt. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
209. Residual claimants might agree to a change of the corporation’s purpose
(which, in the case of such a uniquely fundamental change, might justify a require-
ment for the informed consent of all shareholders).  Alternatively, in some cases, it
might be possible for a corporation to change its purpose, if its residual claimants
receive other substantial, equitable remedy, such as appropriate compensation.
This point differs from the view that “power is purpose within the corporate pol-
ity,” Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose, supra note 144, at 180.  That view
assumes that solely because shareholders are granted the authority to elect direc-
tors, or similar corporate powers, they are the ones who benefit from the corpora-
tion’s pursuit of its purpose.  In fact, first, both stakeholders and shareholders have
this benefit (as the corporation’s purpose must be lawful).  Second, shareholders
have rights not because they have power; rather, they have some power because
that is generally assumed to be a good way to protect their rights, and those of the
corporation.  Even if a lawmaker eliminated or modified shareholders’ power to
elect directors, this would not alter directors’ duty to advance the corporation’s
purpose; and, as explained here, if an attempt was made to change the purpose
itself, shareholders’ rights would be protected by equity.  Note that this applies
regardless of the corporation’s specific purpose: if a nonprofit corporation ig-
nored its purpose and started pursuing profit, its residual claimants (for example,
charity beneficiaries) would have an enforceable claim against the corporation.
210. See supra Section I.C.
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they are not just another group of creditors in a “nexus of contracts.”
Their rights are less than fiduciary or proprietary, but more than contrac-
tual.  In fact, residual claimants are unique creatures of corporate law it-
self.  Specifically, their rights arise in the equity-based portion of corporate
law.  The total value of shares publicly traded on the world’s exchanges, in
2019, was more than $60 trillion.211  Understanding and respecting the
nature of residual claimants’ rights—which is equitable; no more, no
less—is of the highest importance.
E. The Corporation’s Fiduciaries
Every corporation, at any given moment, has at least one fiduciary—
another person, owing fiduciary duties to the corporation.  This fact is a
direct result of corporate law’s other building blocks: “A corporation is a
person, but not a natural person.  It does not have eyes and hands, or any
other bodily and cognitive capacities, entirely of its own.  Therefore, it al-
ways has to operate through someone else (the fiduciary), whom by design
it entrusts with acting in its benefit.”212  In other words, if the corporation
had no fiduciaries, it could simply not operate in the physical world.  In
turn, furthering the corporation’s benefit means acting to cause it to
achieve its purpose.213
The order of sections in this Part of the Article—beginning with the
corporation’s own purpose and personhood, moving to stakeholders, fol-
lowed by residual claimants, and ending with fiduciaries—is not acciden-
tal.  The corporation itself is at the center of corporate law, which aims to
create a legal environment enabling the pursuit of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  Without the corporate person, there would be no corporate law to
speak of.  The corporation must meet all of its positive law obligations to
stakeholders, who enjoy full seniority in claims for its assets.  Only then
may residual claimants see any benefit.  In contrast, the final group—fidu-
ciaries—are not claimants, but obligors.  Fiduciary law applies in a wide
variety of relationships, where inherent power and information asymme-
tries make one party (the beneficiary) wholly dependent upon the actions
of another (the fiduciary).  These include, for example, the lawyer–client,
doctor–patient, guardian–ward, and trustee–beneficiary relationships.214
In this situation, concepts of “contract” are inadequate: by definition, the
beneficiary cannot possibly know what actions the fiduciary might under-
take; any ex ante attempts to “plan” the relationship are doomed to fail-
211. See Stocks Traded, Total Value (Current US$), WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD [https://perma.cc/PFF5-
MKRC] (last visited June 30, 2020).  This should be considered in addition to the
value of shares issued by private, or non-publicly-traded, corporations.
212. Raz, supra note 1, at 270.
213. See supra Section I.A.
214. For additional examples of fiduciary relationships, see Evan J. Criddle,
Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 994 n.1
(2017).
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ure, because the fiduciary might opportunistically use its superior power
and information to upset the beneficiary’s rights and expectations (includ-
ing would-be rights and expectations).215
It is clear, then, why a corporation—which is an artificial person,
wholly dependent upon other people for everything it does—has to be
owed fiduciary duties by those people (and cannot solely rely on some
other framework, such as contract).  The corporation is compelled to
blindly trust its fiduciaries to act in its benefit.216  Fiduciary rights arise
whenever certain conditions, primarily related to power and information
asymmetries, combined with an assumption of “trust and confidence,”217
are met.  By design, such conditions occur every time a new corporation is
formed, and continue throughout the entity’s existence.
In current discourse, much of corporate law is formulated in terms of
this last prong: corporate fiduciary law.  The corporation’s fiduciaries are
presumably meant to act either “for shareholders” or “for all stakehold-
ers.”218  This formulation is misguided.  Fiduciaries’ obligation is fixed: to
advance the corporation’s purpose.  That obligation, of course, is owed to
the corporation.  The true Archimedean point is the law of corporate pur-
pose, and the way it interacts with the other building blocks discussed in
this Article.
2013’s Trados decision219 summarizes this web of relationships rather
neatly.  As the Delaware Court of Chancery wrote,
[Directors’ decisions should] benefit the corporation as a whole,
and by increasing the value of the corporation, the directors in-
crease the share of value available for the residual claimants. . . .
[The “duties to the corporation and its shareholders”] formula-
tion captures the foundational relationship in which directors
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s
residual claimants. . . .  [T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates
that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-
term . . . .  [R]esidual claimants [are] the ultimate beneficiaries of
the firm’s value . . . .220
215. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism
(Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617413 [https://perma.cc/ZL95-VNLZ].
216. See Raz, supra note 1, at 270.
217. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 533, [1998] Ch 1,
18 (appeal taken from Eng.).
218. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101, 105–06 (1979) (attempting to prove that directors should entertain a
broad range of concerns, while discussing several legal norms that constrain the
corporation).  Of course, the corporation must obey the law. See supra Section I.C.
Yet, this has nothing to do with broadening directors’ concerns, beyond their duty
to the corporation: to further the corporation’s lawful purpose.
219. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
220. Id. at 36–41 (emphases added).
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Read carefully, Trados is exceptionally accurate in its analysis of corpo-
rate law’s anatomy.  First, the corporation’s purpose is the long-term pur-
suit of its profit (“increased value”).  Second, the corporation is a person,
as it must be to be owed duties by anyone.221  Third, the corporation is
required to meet all of its legal obligations (those discussed in Trados were
mainly toward preferred shareholders, or “contractual claimants”222).
Fourth, the corporation’s residual claimants have claims toward the corpo-
ration (or “entity” or “firm”), not toward directors; and their benefit is
only “ultimate,” meaning that it is channeled not through instant-gratifica-
tion concepts of “property” or “fiduciary law,” but through the freedom-
limiting, yet equitable, framework of Delaware share law.  Finally, the cor-
poration’s fiduciaries (namely, its directors) owe their duties to the corpora-
tion, to further its value-increasing purpose.  They are not “constituency
directors,”223 but corporate directors, subject to the structure of corporate
law.  Indeed, Trados gets right all five building blocks of corporate law.
As Section II.C below also discusses, attempts to ignore fiduciary law,
or entirely replace it with inaccurate conceptions of contract, ultimately
result in wealth transfers and outsized gains for fiduciaries (who remain
fiduciaries, even when surface-level reading of the law seems to indicate
otherwise).  Contract absolutists, claiming that “regulation” (actually,
law—just like any contract requires law)224 is imperfect, practically ignore
the fact that “contract” or pure “private ordering” is also far from perfect,
certainly in a field (corporate law) which is precisely about strong and weak
parties, open-endedness, and information asymmetries, requiring a cer-
tain core structure of the law, and negating any possibility of exclusive
reliance on ex ante bargaining.  As Professor Melvin Eisenberg succinctly
put it, “just because mandatory rules are imperfect does not mean that
markets would be better.  Commentators who stress the Nirvana Fallacy
are almost invariably themselves guilty of a mirror-image mistake which
might be called the Heavenly Market Fallacy.”225
221. See, e.g., Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal Relations,
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 238, 239–40 (2002) (“[Hohfeld] argues that a legal relation is
always between two persons . . . .  [I]f someone has a Hohfeldian right, another
person has a duty.”).
222. Trados, 73 A.3d at 41.  Of course, the same applies not just for “contrac-
tual” claims, but those arising under any field of positive law.  In Trados, the pre-
ferred shareholders indeed had a contractual, non-corporate law mechanism to
determine their legal claim. See id. at 21–24, 38–39.  However, “preferred shares”
encompass a broad range of securities, with varying properties; a preferred share-
holder’s claim might be residual (at least in part), and therefore, determined
within corporate share law. See Raz, supra note 1, at 281.
223. On the idea of constituency directors, owing fiduciary duties directly to
certain shareholders or stakeholders (and therefore, necessarily not to the corpo-
ration), and the rejection of that idea both positively and normatively, see Trados,
73 A.3d at 42 n.16.
224. See infra note 285.
225. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461, 1525 (1989).
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Despite these repeated attacks at the hands of contract absolutists,
fiduciary law remains salient.  Experience in fields besides corporate law—
for example, financial regulation—demonstrates the same: a recent paper
finds that “fiduciary duty leads broker-dealers to sell higher quality prod-
ucts,”226 characterized by lower fees and better returns.  As always, the eco-
nomic analysis must rest on a structural legal framework, telling us whose
benefit the law is there to maximize.  Broker-dealers, just like corporate
directors, might feel consternation at the restrictions imposed by fiduciary
law.227  Such feelings cannot modify the basic tenets of the relationship
(which fiduciaries enter voluntarily): the beneficiary’s welfare is at the
center, and the fiduciary must wholeheartedly act to this sole end.  In cor-
porate law, the beneficiary-corporation’s welfare equals the achievement
of its purpose.  Fiduciary law is the only toolbox designed for, and capable
of, resolving the unique problems arising in a situation of absolute power
and information asymmetries between multiple actors, one of whom is
meant to promote the other’s interests.  Since the corporation is a person,
but can only operate through others, on whom it utterly depends, corpo-
rate fiduciary law is a structural, unwaivable building block of corporate
law.
II. APPLYING THE PURPOSE APPROACH TO THREE CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
In a 1993 article, Professor Lyman Johnson remarks, “if discourse in
corporate law does not reflect matters of deep personal significance—that
is, if it is not carried on with our moral voice—I wonder if that discourse
will be important in the larger collective sphere.”228  Previous sections of
this Article touch upon issues such as the opioid crisis229 and forced arbi-
tration.230  This Part explores three topics in greater detail: shareholder
activism, corporations’ constitutional rights, and the rise of LLCs and
other “alternative” corporations.  These issues lie at the intersection of cor-
porate law and broader social life, deeply affecting both.  This Article’s
theory produces new, fundamental insights on each of these high-cur-
rency topics.
226. Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes & Manisha Padi, Fiduciary Duty
and the Market for Financial Advice 45 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281345 [https://perma.cc/ZT62-9P8Z].
227. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 224 (“Corporate law cannot be
everything to everyone.  While individuals may chafe at various prohibitions, iso-
lated cases need not detract from the merits of an efficient regulatory design.”).
Note that the use of the term “regulatory” to describe fiduciary law is inaccurate.
See infra note 285.
228. Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1713, 1713 (1993).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 162–64.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 115–23.
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A. Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is the most important phenomenon in U.S. cor-
porate law over the last two decades.231  The basic concept gives rise to
many strands of debate and scholarship, largely depending on the type of
activist (or not-activist-enough),232 or a certain outcome of its operations,
such as index funds,233 the “problem of twelve,”234 “wolf pack” hedge
funds,235 and “common ownership.”236  This Section places shareholder
activism within the structure of corporate law, outlined in this Article.  It
then considers a common scenario—an institutional shareholder owing
fiduciary duties to both its own investors and a corporation toward which it
is active—to show how this Article’s theory can aid in resolving an oft-
encountered, high-stakes situation.
In the structure of corporate law, shareholders and fiduciaries are two
distinct actors.  Each occupies a separate, almost polar, role in respect to
the corporation: shareholders are residual claimants, equitably entitled to a
residual value that fluctuates with the corporation’s fortunes (that is, the
degree to which it attains its purpose).237  The corporation’s fiduciaries,
on the other hand, mainly have obligations—specifically, a fiduciary duty to
loyally and devotedly cause the corporation to achieve its purpose.238  Un-
less fiduciaries also own shares (which they often do), nothing entitles
them to enjoy the corporation’s residual value.  Equally, as a rule, share-
holders are not fiduciaries for the corporation.239
231. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 13, at 156 (“Hedge fund activism is to corpo-
rate law’s early twenty-first century what the hostile takeover was to its late twenti-
eth century.”).
232. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corpo-
rate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (argu-
ing that index fund managers should play a greater role in corporate governance).
233. See, e.g., id.
234. See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve 2 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-07, 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 [https://perma.cc/4YEB-
FABV] (discussing the possibility that “control of most public companies . . . will
soon be concentrated in the hands of a dozen or fewer people”).
235. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 172 (discussing the detrimental effects of
some hedge fund activists on the long-term performance of some public
corporations).
236. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Common Ownership and
Coordinated Effects (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-40, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296488 [https://perma.cc/Y8LV-
HVQN] (discussing the intersection of corporate law and competition law, as re-
sulting from large institutional shareholders owning shares of multiple corpora-
tions operating in the same industry).
237. See supra Section I.D.
238. See supra Section I.E.
239. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded
Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 47–48 (2017) (“Shareholders do not act as
fiduciaries when they exercise their voting rights, and they are under no obligation
to vote their shares in the best interests of the corporation.” (footnote omitted)).
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The rule has an exception.  Some shareholders are also fiduciaries.
That duty can be imposed on a variety of shareholders—such as a control-
ling shareholder, or a plaintiff in a derivative action—but the principle is
this: “[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership
of stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation,
he assumes the duties of care and loyalty of a director of the corpora-
tion.”240  The principle coheres with the overall structure of corporate
law: the corporation is an artificial person, wholly dependent on others,
through whom it acts in the world.  Normally, those others are called “di-
rectors” or “managers,” but nothing precludes additional people—such as
a shareholder with a large enough voting stake—from directing the corpo-
ration’s actions, at least in part (or in concert with others, as in the “wolf
pack” scenario).
Here lies the key to understanding and handling the shareholder ac-
tivism phenomenon: activism is not about shareholders as such.  The struc-
ture of corporate law gives individual shareholders no right to direct the
corporation’s actions, but only to (ultimately) reap their fruits.  An activist
is a shareholder who willfully became a fiduciary for the corporation.  The
quantitative inquiry policymakers and scholars should make is not whether
share prices rose as a result of an activist campaign, but whether the corpo-
ration now better achieves its purpose—the lawful pursuit of its profit.
The two metrics very often align.  A fiduciary-shareholder can see a rise in
share value (within the time horizon favored by the shareholder), and
meet all duties toward the corporation.  When they do not,241 corporate
law mandates that the latter override the former.
Reality presents further complications.  In the common scenario, the
activist is not an individual acting in one’s own benefit,242 but is itself a
fiduciary for other people down the line, such as pension savers or private
equity investors.  There might be a very definite time horizon over which
240. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105,
at *63 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991).  For an article applying a similar principle specifi-
cally to activist shareholders, see Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for
Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008).
241. For discussion of such situations, see Raz, supra note 1, at 272, 276–78,
282–85, 291 n.145, 293–95, 304–05, 311–19 (discussing various conflicts or dispari-
ties between the corporation and all or part of its shareholders); Strine, supra note
172.  At the macroeconomic level, it is possible that shareholder activism, includ-
ing by hedge fund managers, has a neutral or positive effect. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe,
Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71 (2018).  This Article fo-
cuses on the firm level, where specific instances of activism can have varying
effects.
242. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solo-
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the fiduciary has to maximize its investors’ stake, such as ten years for
some hedge funds.243
Assume the following hypothetical: a hedge fund has been set up for a
ten-year period, after which it has to liquidate, distributing all assets to its
investors.  Nine years have elapsed; the hedge fund manager has one more
year to maximize returns.  It now contemplates initiating an activist cam-
paign at the largest corporation in its portfolio, which would lead the tar-
get to sell its central asset (say, a research and development division).
According to ample information, that move is likely to result in a 10%
increase in share price over the next year.  If, however, the asset is not sold,
equally robust predictions indicate that the target corporation would see a
6% annual increase in profits, and a similar (anyway, less than 10%) an-
nual increase in share price, over a twenty-year period.  At the end of that
period, the corporation’s residual value would be higher, in net present
value terms, than if the main asset is now sold.  How can the two fiduciary
duties owed by the activist—one to its own investors; the other to the cor-
poration whose actions it partly “direct[s]”244—be settled?
This requires addressing an “egg and chicken” problem.  What came
first: the corporation itself, its shares, and the rights and duties they con-
fer, or the hedge fund manager’s ownership of those shares?  The answer
is easy: at any moment of its existence as the target corporation’s share-
holder, the hedge fund manager held something that existed beforehand
(the share, or its corporate law-derived nature).  When share ownership,
or certain activities it enables, also make someone a fiduciary for the target
corporation, that duty precedes other fiduciary duties, which the activist
could never have had if corporations and shares did not exist in the first
place.245
The analysis so far does not conclusively entail that the hedge fund
manager should forego the activist campaign.  Corporate law does not ex-
plicitly set the corporation’s time horizon at twenty years, rather than one
year, or any other number.  Yet, corporate law does provide certain de-
faults, or presumptions, in this regard.  For example, in its 2013 Trados
decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery states that “[a] Delaware corpo-
ration, by default, has a perpetual existence. . . .  [T]he duty of loyalty . . .
243. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 764, 811 (2012).
244. Cinerama, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *63.
245. Put differently, any person, including hedge fund managers, is required
to act lawfully.  This Article expands on that requirement as it applies to all corpo-
rations. See supra Section I.C.  In regard to hedge fund managers, the lawfulness
requirement includes meeting all fiduciary obligations toward the corporations in
which they invest.  A hedge fund manager and its investors know what they are
getting into when the manager adopts an active investment strategy; they must
accept corporate law, and the rights and duties it imposes, as a given.  Corporate
law, on the other hand, is not required (and is informationally unable) to change
itself according to one fiduciary or another’s obligations to third parties.
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mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the
long-term.”246
On a deeper level, the very concept of the corporation—indeed hav-
ing perpetual existence, as well as its own identity and traits—suggests that
a corporation’s time horizon should tend to the longer term.  Professor
Lynn Stout’s 2015 article247 compares the corporation to a “time ma-
chine,” suggesting that “corporate entities can be understood as institu-
tions designed to transfer wealth forward from earlier time periods to later
time periods,”248 and concluding, “if we do not continue to have thriving
corporations . . . future generations will be left worse off than they could,
or should, be.”249
This accords with the theory presented here: nothing makes the cor-
poration’s present state more important than its future state; just as a natu-
ral person may expend less today to live better tomorrow, so can a
corporation.  If it can be shown that a given action would improve the
corporation’s prospects, that action ought to be taken, even if present-day
shareholders (or stakeholders) do not instantly receive what they might
wish for.  From this perspective, many activist campaigns are beneficial,
and should be encouraged.  Others are less so.  In any case, shareholders
who materially influence the affairs of a corporation may not operate for
their own benefit (although it may well accrue to them, as derived from
the corporation’s).  Activists, like directors, CEOs, and anyone else in cor-
porate law, operate within the bounds of a structure.
B. Corporations’ Constitutional Rights
The two most famous corporate law cases of this century, Citizens
United250 and Hobby Lobby,251 are not, in fact, cases about corporate law.
More precisely, it plays a part in both cases, but their disposition mainly
lies in other fields: constitutional law, along with election, health, and em-
ployment law.  This Section proceeds in three steps: first, it criticizes the
misapplication of corporate law by the Court in both cases (namely, the
erroneous utilization of a nineteenth-century-like “aggregate” model); it
then shows how, even when we apply correct corporate theory, the out-
comes in both cases could have been reached; finally, it explains, in simi-
lar fashion to Section I.C above, that these cases—and their possible
future undoing—do not (and should not) have much to do with corpo-
rate law.
246. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013).
247. Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015).
248. Id. at 686.
249. Id. at 722.
250. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
251. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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In both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively
ignores one of corporate law’s building blocks: the fact that the corpora-
tion is a person, with rights and duties separate from, and possibly conflict-
ing with, those of any other person, including its shareholders.252  Instead,
the Court relies on a theory “which was prevalent in the 19th cen-
tury”253—the “aggregate” model of the corporation, according to which a
corporation is merely a grouping of other individuals.  In Citizens United,
Justice Kennedy describes the corporation as “an association that has
taken on the corporate form.”254  Similarly, in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito
calls corporate personhood a “fiction”255 and surmises that “[w]hen rights
. . . are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of
[the] people [associated with the corporation].”256  Adding insult to mis-
understanding, he implies that corporations are “own[ed]”257 by their
shareholders.
Indeed, “[c]orporate personhood . . . is entirely missing from the [Cit-
izens United] opinion. . . . [T]he Citizens United decision obscured the cor-
porate entity and emphasized the rights of others, like shareholders and
listeners.”258  The same holds true for Hobby Lobby.  As this Article demon-
strates extensively, the Court’s assertions have little to do with actual cor-
porate law.  In fact, they even clash with case law from the Supreme Court
itself.259  What might have led the Court to embark on this deconstructive
enterprise?  Very plausibly, the Court simply tried to find an explanation
for how for-profit corporations, supposedly meant to pursue “business-re-
lated” activities, can also engage in political activity and have religious be-
liefs.  Such explanation, however, does not require an “aggregate” model
of the corporation.
The outcomes in both cases could be achieved with correct corporate
law.  As a rule, corporations have the same legal capacity as natural per-
sons.260  Accordingly, a corporation should enjoy the same rights—and
bear the same duties—as a natural person with similar traits, in constitu-
tional law as in any other field.  Within corporate law, the corporation’s ac-
252. See supra Section I.B.
253. Hill, supra note 79, at 42.
254. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
255. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706.
256. Id. at 706–07.
257. Id. at 707.
258. WINKLER, supra note 54, at 364.
259. See Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 485–95 (surveying “The Supreme
Court’s Treatment of the Corporate Entity in Other Areas of Law”).
260. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  The Pennsylvania statute—
under which Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, one of the plaintiffs in
Hobby Lobby, is incorporated—says so explicitly. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501
(2020) (“[A] business corporation shall have the legal capacity of natural persons
to act.”); see also Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 530 (“[C]orporations are crea-
tures of state law, and therefore state law rules should guide our understanding
about the essential nature of these entities.”).
49
Raz: A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
572 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 523
tions are subject to an ever-looming restriction: the law of corporate
purpose.261 If having political or religious beliefs, either at all or specific
ones, steers a certain corporation away from its purpose, then holding and
exercising such beliefs violates corporate law.  The corporation (and possi-
bly its fiduciaries, who breached their duty to further the corporation’s
purpose)262 should then face appropriate sanction.263  Yet, neither Citi-
zens United nor Hobby Lobby suggest that these were the facts of the case.
For some corporations, exercising such beliefs might advance the corpora-
tion’s purpose—for example, if the corporation operates in a community
of like-minded people, who are therefore more likely to purchase its prod-
ucts and services.
Does the above necessarily mean that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby,
if only we corrected their corporate law mistakes, are good decisions that
should be reaffirmed in the future?  Of course not.  Consistent with this
Article’s distinction between corporate law and general, non-corporate law
(the latter governing the corporation’s relationships with its various stake-
holders),264 Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are not primarily corporate law
cases.  They are cases in constitutional law—specifically, the First Amend-
ment.265  The real question behind these cases is not whether corporations
should be able to exercise their First Amendment rights in a certain way,
but whether rich, influential people (human or corporate) should be able
to do so.266  If a natural person was engaged in political financing to the
same extent as Citizens United, or had the same number of employees as
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., that would give rise to precisely the same ques-
tions: how should the law balance the constitutional and human interest
in a functional, representative democracy with political freedom of
speech?  How should the law balance employment and reproductive rights
with religious ones?  A small-scale corporation is less likely to provoke
these questions, although it is fully a corporation, presenting all the issues
(or building blocks) inherent to corporate law.
Constitutional law is largely about determining when the state may
treat different people in different ways, including on account of their
wealth, or their ability to affect others’ lives (say, through political influ-
ence).  Quite possibly, the Court got the answers wrong.  Yet, as Justice
Stevens notes in his Citizens United dissent, “[n]othing in this analysis turns
261. See supra Section I.A.
262. See supra Section I.E.
263. It is at this point that much of the corporate law scholarship about Citi-
zens United and Hobby Lobby comes into the picture. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83
(2010) (suggesting a framework for corporate decision-making on whether and how
to engage in political speech, while presupposing that corporations can engage in
such speech).
264. See supra Section I.C.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
266. This is supported by case law from the Supreme Court, particularly the
Munn v. Illinois decision. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state con-
cession, a nexus of . . . contracts, a mediated hierarchy . . . , or any other
recognized model.”267  Justice Stevens does not mention the one correct
answer—“a legal person”—but his main point is clear: Citizens United is a
case about influence on the political process, and the constitutional limita-
tions it should face.  That issue is separate from the corporate law ques-
tion.268  If the cases are overturned by a future Court, this would detract
nothing from the structure of corporate law (if anything, it would be an
opportunity to reinforce the correct roles of corporate purpose, per-
sonhood, and shareholders within that structure).269  Save for the useful
mistake they make, as described in this Section, Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby do not—and are not supposed to—tell us much about corporate
law.
C. Alternative Corporations
In the United States, specifically Delaware, a person wishing to start a
corporation270 can choose among a wide variety of forms: besides the en-
tity type which the statute calls a “corporation,”271 it is possible to establish
a partnership,272 statutory trust,273 or limited liability company.274
267. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
268. See, e.g., Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 530 (“[W]hatever one might
say about Citizens United from a constitutional law perspective, the case is bad cor-
porate law.”).
269. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COM-
MENT. 309, 326 (2015) (“One can support campaign finance regulation . . . and
still acknowledge corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights as
well.”).
270. On the broad meaning of “corporation” as used in this Article, see supra
note 1.  The distinction made there is particularly important in the context of this
Section.
271. See Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1
(2020).
272. See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch.
15 (2020); Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, tit. 6, ch. 17.  It is
possible for a general (non-limited) partnership not to be a corporation, if the
partners specifically agree so. See § 15-201(a) (“A partnership is a separate legal
entity which is an entity distinct from its partners unless otherwise provided in a
statement of partnership existence or a statement of qualification and in a partner-
ship agreement.”).  Yet, by default, a partnership is a corporation, presenting all of
corporate law’s building blocks, see supra Part I: purpose (see, e.g., § 15-202(a)
(“[An association to carry on] a business for profit forms a partnership . . . and [an
association] to carry on any purpose or activity not for profit [may form] a partner-
ship . . . .”)); personhood (see §§ 15-201(a), 17-201(b) (“A limited partnership
formed under this chapter shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”)); stakeholders (see,
e.g., § 15-305 (stating that a partnership may be “liable for loss or injury caused to a
person”)); residual claimants (see §§ 15-101(6), 17-101(13) (defining a partner’s
economic interest as “partner’s share of the profits and losses” of a partnership));
and fiduciaries (see §§ 15-401(f) (“Each partner has equal rights [(i.e., powers)] in
the management and conduct of the partnership business and affairs.”), 17-101(9)
(stating that every limited partnership must have “1 or more general partners”),
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The latter form—the limited liability company (LLC)—is today the
most prevalent type of corporation in Delaware and across the U.S., vastly
outnumbering narrow-sense “corporations.”275  In daily life, it becomes in-
creasingly common to see the letters “LLC”—not “Inc.”—appended to the
name of the corporation one works for, supplies goods to, or gets products
and services from.  LLCs permeate all levels of economic, financial, and
personal life: in fact, the New York Stock Exchange, which runs the
world’s largest and most important securities marketplace, is itself an
LLC.276  So is Google.277  Many LLCs have their shares (or “limited liabil-
17-403(c) (discussing “the general partner’s . . . powers and duties to manage and
control the business and affairs of the limited partnership”)).  In the case of gen-
eral partnerships, residual claimants and fiduciaries are the same people.
273. See Delaware Statutory Trust Act, tit. 12, ch. 38.  It is possible for a statu-
tory trust not to be a corporation, if the parties to its governing instrument specifi-
cally agree so. See § 3801(g) (“Any . . . statutory trust . . . , unless otherwise
provided in its certificate of trust and in its governing instrument, [shall be] a
separate legal entity.”).  Yet, by default, a statutory trust is a corporation, present-
ing all of corporate law’s building blocks, see supra Part I: purpose (see
§ 3801(g)(1)); personhood (see §§ 3801(g), 3810(a)(2), 3812(f)); stakeholders
(see, e.g., § 3804(a) (discussing “debts and other obligations or liabilities” for which
the trust may be sued)); residual claimants (see §§ 3801(a), 3801(g), 3805 (discuss-
ing the trust’s beneficial owners and the nature of their rights, known as “benefi-
cial interests”); see also Raz, supra note 1, at 272–75 (explaining that every legal
person always has residual claimants)); and fiduciaries, see § 3807(a).  Apparently,
unless the creation of a separate entity has been avoided according to § 3801(g),
the trust itself is the person serving as trustee for the beneficial owners (which also
accords with the common law of trusts, since the trust—not the “trustee”—legally
owns the trust property), while the “trustees” are fiduciaries for the trust (with few
channeling principle exceptions, see supra text accompanying notes 192–95).  To
illustrate this distinction, consider a situation where a beneficial owner would ben-
efit from a distribution of the trust’s assets, while the trust itself would be harmed:
to whom do the trustees owe their duties?  Clearly, to the trust, considering first
principles. See supra Sections I.B, I.E; see also, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. JWH Special Cir-
cumstance LLC, 959 A.2d 1096 passim (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing fiduciary duties
owed “to the trust” and finding possible breaches of those duties).  Note that, as
with other corporations (such as mutual insurance companies, see Raz, supra note
1, at 275 & n.79), the beneficial owners of a statutory trust have a dual relationship
with the corporation: by default, along with their equitable rights under share law,
they have rights as trust law beneficiaries. See § 3809 (“Except to the extent other-
wise provided in the governing instrument of a statutory trust or in this sub-
chapter, the laws of this State pertaining to trusts are hereby made applicable to
statutory trusts . . . .”).
274. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, tit. 6, ch. 18.
275. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth About LLCs,
42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 391, 393 n.5 (2018) (citing data showing that as of Dec. 31,
2016, there were 827,611 Delaware LLCs and 298,025 “Delaware corporations” in
existence).
276. See EDGAR Search Results for New York Stock Exchange LLC, EDGAR,
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0000876661 [https://perma.cc/
T7TB-8B8X] (last visited June 30, 2020).
277. See Certificate of Conversion of Google Inc. (a Delaware corpora-
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ity company interests”278) publicly traded.279  In short, LLCs operate in
the world, get their incentives, and affect the lives of others, in precisely the
same way as any other corporation.280  Given the small, bordering on non-
existent, practical difference between a narrow-sense “corporation” and an
LLC, we might wake up in the not-too-distant future in an LLC-dominated
world.  To sustain meaningful discourse in this area, it is time to clarify the
actual legal difference between LLCs and other corporations.
An oft-repeated statement is that LLCs are “unincorporated” entities,
or “uncorporations.”281  That is an incident of historical terminology: the
constitutional documents of narrow-sense “corporations” are known as
“charters” or “certificates of incorporation,” and the act of “granting” a
charter is known as “chartering” or “incorporation.”  This evokes an aroma
of government involvement, of the kind prevalent before the rise of gen-
eral incorporation.282
Today, however, the process of establishing both types of corpora-
tions—a narrow-sense “corporation” and an LLC—requires the same,
minimal level of government action: in both cases, certain documents
have to be filed with the Secretary of State, often through the internet; if
those documents are properly formatted and a fee is paid, a new corpora-
tion is created.283  No substantive government act—that is, no choice be-
278. See tit. 6, §§ 18-101(10) (defining “[l]imited liability company interest” as
“a member’s share of the profits and losses of a limited liability company and a
member’s right to receive distributions of the limited liability company’s assets”),
18-701 (“A limited liability company interest is personal property.  A member has
no interest in specific limited liability company property.”). Cf. Raz, supra note 1,
at 272–76, 285–87 (discussing characteristics of corporate shares, identical to those
of LLC interests).  Thus, we may speak of “LLC share law” (as with other corpora-
tions, discussed id.).  It is possible to be an LLC member without acquiring an LLC
interest (also often known as “LLC unit”). See § 18-301(d).  Yet, assuming that every
member has some claim toward the LLC (otherwise, what is the meaning of “mem-
bership?”), those legal claims (even if not “packaged” as LLC interests, or shares)
have to be governed by some legal framework, that is, LLC share law.  More gener-
ally, “share law” and “residual claimancy law” can be regarded as synonymous.
279. See, e.g., New Fortress Energy LLC Class A Shares Representing Limited Liability
Company Interests (NFE), NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/
stocks/nfe [https://perma.cc/WEU5-VHCR] (last visited June 30, 2020) (provid-
ing information on a public LLC with market capitalization of approximately $2.2
billion).
280. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Trust v. Law (in a Box): Do Organizational
Forms Really Make a Difference?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (“Virtues like trust
and their counterpart vices—greed, fear, panic—seem to me as likely to kick in
after the fact whether we are talking about partnerships, limited partnerships,
LLCs, [or] corporations . . . .”).
281. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010) (discuss-
ing the increased popularity and legal theories relating to LLCs and other alterna-
tive entities).
282. For a discussion of chartering by special legislation in the nineteenth
century, and the transition to general incorporation, see, for example,
Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 1634–40.
283. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 3, at 831 n.164 (“Most state statutes impose
only pro forma requirements for incorporation, which typically include the filing
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tween competing alternatives, made by a public official—is involved in the
creation of either a narrow-sense “corporation” or an LLC.  The state is
not party to the “corporate contract” in any meaningful way.  The state
does legislate and adjudicate corporate law, which—although highly struc-
tured and partly unwaivable, as this Article explains—is simply a legal field
governing relations between private actors.  These actors, not the state,
create the corporation.284  In this regard, contract law is the same: the
existence of a contract statute285 does not mean that the state is party to
every contract.  Therefore, the “unincorporated” terminology is as non-
dispositive as the use of the word “charter,” rather than “operating agree-
ment,” or any other moniker, for the corporation’s constitutional docu-
ments.  Even on these linguistic grounds, there is no actual difference
between an LLC and any other corporation.
More importantly, LLCs are corporations, just like narrow-sense, “Del-
aware corporations,” because they have precisely the same anatomy, and
give rise to the same set of problems.  Going back to the distinction be-
tween “structural” and “dynamic” meanings,286 there certainly are dynamic
of a certificate of incorporation, signed by an ‘incorporator,’ who may be almost
anyone, and a payment of a fee.  The most regulated part of this process is the
choosing of the corporate name.”).  The creation of an LLC identically requires
only the filing of a certificate of formation and payment of filing fees. See tit. 6,
§§ 18-201(a), 18-206(a).
284. For recent sources expressing a view that “the state” has a significant
relationship with every corporation, including as the corporation’s creator, see, for
example, Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 19, 2018), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020); Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note
112; Macey & Strine, supra note 49.  However, none of these sources cite a con-
crete example of any substantive role the state plays within corporate law, in terms
of bearing rights and duties.  In context, it seems each of these sources simply aim
to argue, correctly, that corporate law differs from a pure “private ordering” re-
gime.  It is true that law is required for any corporation to exist; yet, the same is
also true of any contract and any property.  Corporate law is part of private law,
which is established (at least partly) by the state, but generally does not give the
state itself a role within the various relationships it enables. See John C.P.
Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640
(2012) (“Private law is law, so government is involved, albeit in a particular way.
Typically, it makes available institutions and procedures that enable individuals
and entities to define their relationships and to assert and demand the resolution
of claims against others.” (emphasis added)).
285. See U.C.C. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (Uniform Com-
mercial Code, adopted in whole or part by all U.S. states, and providing legal
norms governing various types of contracts).  Contract law, just like corporate law,
has unwaivable structure—for example, the rule that a contract legally binds the
parties to it.  Otherwise, it is not a contract at all. See infra note 306.  This point
also bears on the mistaken view that fiduciary law, or anything other than “private
ordering,” is a form of “regulation,” see, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 553, 562 (2001) (implying that fiduciary law is “[m]andatory regulation
that forces people to attend to others’ interests”).  However, precisely as in a con-
tract case, a court adjudicating a breach of fiduciary duty does not engage in gov-
ernmental “regulation,” but merely resolves a dispute between private parties,
arising within a private (albeit asymmetric) relationship.
286. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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differences between LLCs and narrow-sense “corporations”—for example,
in regard to members’ or shareholders’ rights to receive a distribution of
the corporation’s assets,287 the transferability of shares,288 or issues
outside corporate law, such as tax treatment (itself related to the corpo-
rate dynamic choices; the greater ease of withdrawing assets from an LLC,
compared to a narrow-sense “corporation,” might motivate different tax
rules).
Yet, on the more fundamental, structural level,289 LLCs and other
corporations are exactly the same.  Does an LLC have a purpose?  Yes.290
Is it a person, with general capacity to act and bear rights and duties?
Yes.291  Does it have stakeholders?  Yes.292  Does it have residual claimants?
Yes; they are called “members.”293  Does it have fiduciaries?  Yes; they
might be the members, or “managers.”294  We can modify the rules of
capital lock-in, transferability of shares, ability to contract around certain
legislative or common law provisions, and many other dynamic topics, but
we are still dealing with a corporation.  This Article’s discussion of corpo-
rate law’s structure, and the issues it inherently gives rise to, equally applies
to LLCs.  The insistence on making some deep-seated distinction between
287. See, e.g., Robert L. Symonds, Jr. & Matthew J. O’Toole, SYMONDS &
O’TOOLE ON DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 7.02[B] (2d ed. 2018)
(“[T]he statute provides significant latitude to fashion . . . distribution rights . . . .
Limited liability company interests may carry distinctly tailored rights pertaining to
. . . distributions.”).  Such pre-agreed distribution (dividend or buyback, including
share redemption) can also be made by a narrow-sense “corporation,” if it does not
breach the mandatory rules governing distributions. See Raz, supra note 1, at 274
n.77.  Yet, pre-agreed distributions are more prevalent in alternative corporations.
288. See, e.g., tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(1) (“An assignment of a limited liability com-
pany interest does not entitle the assignee to become or to exercise any rights or
powers of a member[.]”).
289. See supra Part I (discussing the building blocks of corporate law).
290. See tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (“A limited liability company may carry on any law-
ful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit . . . .”).
291. See § 18-201(b) (“A limited liability company formed under this chapter
shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”); see also Manesh, supra note 275, at 415–16
(discussing “separate legal existence” as a defining, unwaivable, and practically im-
portant characteristic of every LLC).
292. See §§ 18-303 (“[T]he debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited liabil-
ity company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the
debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company . . . .”), 18-607
(discussing the “liabilities of the limited liability company”).
293. See § 18-101(8) (“‘Limited liability company’ . . . means a limited liability
company formed under the laws of the State of Delaware and having 1 or more
members.”); supra note 278 (discussing the nature of LLC members’ rights, the
same as those of other corporations’ residual claimants).
294. See §§ 18-402 (“Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company
agreement, the management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its
members . . . ; provided however, that if a limited liability company agreement
provides for the management . . . of a limited liability company by a manager, the
management . . . shall be vested in the manager . . . .”), 18-1104 (“In any case not
provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law
and equity relating to fiduciary duties . . . , shall govern.”).
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LLCs and other corporations is all language and no substance.295  This
rather obvious fact has been recognized by scholars296 and leaders of Dela-
ware law.297
In one important area, however, LLC law purports to break with corpo-
rate law.  That area is the fifth building block discussed above: corporate
fiduciary law.298  LLC statutes in many places,299 including Delaware, pre-
sumably give parties to the LLC agreement the option to eliminate all fi-
duciary duties owed by the corporation’s managers or other fiduciaries.300
The only correct answer to this trend is: “not so fast.”
As explained above, every corporation must be the beneficiary of fidu-
ciary duties, at any given moment.301  The corporation cannot “waive” all
of its fiduciary law protections, because even in purely contractual terms,
such offer and acceptance cannot occur.  Given the open-ended, ex-
tremely asymmetric nature of these relationships, the beneficiary is enti-
tled to a protective mechanism that transcends purported “consent” to
entirely unknowable future scenarios.302
Indeed, the belief that fiduciary duties can be “eliminated” counters
the most fundamental notion of what a director or manager is meant to
295. See, e.g., Joshua Fershee, Posts in the Category “LLCs”, BUS. L. PROF
BLOG, https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/llcs [https://perma.cc/
F8J2-N9HT] (last visited June 30, 2020) (criticizing, in dozens of blog posts since
2013, courts and others who use phrases such as “limited liability corporation”).
Professor Fershee is entirely correct that an LLC is not a narrow-sense “corpora-
tion,” as the term is used in most U.S. law.  Yet, the substantive question is whether
LLCs omit any of the legal and economic issues inherent to all corporations
(broadly defined, see supra note 1), which they do not.
296. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 247, at 689 n.7 (“[S]ome LLCs are the func-
tional equivalents of close corporations . . . .  [A]n LLC whose shares are listed for
trading on a recognized exchange . . . becom[es] a public corporation in all but
name.”).  For another criticism of alternative corporation exceptionalism (in the
very similar context of statutory trusts, see supra note 273), see Anne Tucker, Justice
Scalia’s Final Mark on Corporate Law May Be One of Form over Substance, BUS. L. PROF
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2016), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/02/
justice-scalias-final-mark-on-corporate-law-form-over-substance.html [https://
perma.cc/5ZVK-7C3N].
297. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contrac-
tual Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE
FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 14–17 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loew-
enstein eds., 2015) (noting that LLCs and narrow-sense “corporations” have the
same characteristics, except for tax treatment, which is not part of corporate law).
298. See supra Section I.E.
299. See Manesh, supra note 275, at 394 n.6 (listing state LLC statutes that
presumably allow for waiver of fiduciary duties).
300. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(c), 18-1101(e) (2020).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 212–17.
302. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Motivation, Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary
Accountability Cannot Be Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159,
179 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) (“These asymmetries [due to
unobservable and unverifiable information] provide a compelling justification for
a strict, full-disclosure-based accountability regime. . . .  Fiduciary law thus pre-
serves an irreducible core of accountability to ensure fiduciary loyalty.”).
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do: act for the benefit of the corporation, because no one else is there to
do so.303 Truly eliminating fiduciary duties means abolishing the concept
of directors and managers, period.  That, in turn, entails disposing of cor-
porations altogether, since they could do nothing: there would be no one
to operate on their behalf.  The act of “eliminating” all fiduciary duties “by
contract” is impossible, as it negates the entity itself.  Contract is not a
license to make stuff up.304
Thus, when courts fail to enforce one party’s fiduciary obligation to
another, they are not “giv[ing] the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.”305  They are doing the exact opposite: by overlooking the
norms and enforcement mechanisms that make this unique type of docu-
ment operative, they essentially turn these instruments into something
akin to an illusory contract.306
As importantly, LLC statutes never had the power to allow for the elimi-
nation of fiduciary duties.  Those duties arise in equity, not “created” by
any legislative act.307  Equity cannot be contracted around or legislated
away.  It is precisely the concept of equity to protect rights even when, for
some reason, contractual and legislative “law” purports to negate them.  In
Delaware, as anywhere else, directors and managers of all corporations (in-
cluding alternative ones) are fiduciaries, and never stopped being.
When a legislature creates “law” that simply makes no sense, on the
most definitional level—for example, saying “any contract may be breached
without remedy” or “a corporation can exist without fiduciaries”—this is
not the final word.  Equity is always part of the law.308  Courts are always
303. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 219 (“If managers are not acting
with the corporation’s interests in mind, what is their conceivable purpose or
role?”).
304. Cf. Ravenswood Inv. Co., L.P. v. Estate of Winmill, Nos. 3730-VCS, 7048-
VCS (Consol.), 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2018) (“Equity is
not a license to make stuff up.”).
305. § 18-1101(b).
306. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 125 (“A contract which is not mutually
enforceable is illusory.  An ‘illusory promise’ is one which . . . by its terms makes
performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor.  In
other words, a promise is illusory when it fails to bind the promisor, who retains
the option of discontinuing performance.” (footnotes omitted)). Cf. McNeil v. Mc-
Neil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (“Courts . . . flatly refuse to enforce provisions
relieving a trustee of all liability.  A trust in which there is no legally binding obliga-
tion on a trustee is a trust in name only . . . .” (citation omitted)).
307. See, e.g., J D Heydon, Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and
Skill Fiduciary?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 185, 234 (Simone Degeling & James
Edelman eds., 2005) (“It cannot be said that equity does not lay down prescriptive
rules and leaves it to ‘company law’ to do so: the prescriptive duty to act in the best
interests of the company is imposed on directors because of equity, not because of
some aspect of ‘company law’ which is outside equity.”).
308. In this Article, “equity” is used not in a historical sense, of a normative
system distinct from “law,” but in a broader substantive sense, see, e.g., Manesh,
supra note 275, at 425 (“[E]quity [is also referred to here] in the broader sense,
meaning the power vested in all courts ‘to do right and justice’ by exercising judi-
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vested with equitable power, which includes the duty to apply the law cor-
rectly, even if contrary to a simplistic reading of statutory text.  At the fed-
eral level, the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity.”309  At the state level, particularly
in Delaware, equitable jurisdiction enjoys similar constitutional protec-
tions.310  Even if no text said that every court is required to do justice—and
that every person is entitled to justice—this fact is self-evident.  It is there-
fore an invalid, empty defense to simply mention that LLC statutes allow
for the waiver of fiduciary duties.  Reading the whole statute, and under-
standing what an LLC—or any other corporation—actually is, clarifies
that at least a “core”311 of fiduciary obligation always persists.
So, what is the practical meaning of the “elimination” of fiduciary du-
ties owed to Delaware alternative corporations, or anyone else in like posi-
tion?  It means that certain actors, bound by certain duties, are better
positioned to breach those duties with impunity.  Most fiduciaries do not
act unlawfully.  Yet, certain legislative acts and court decisions afford them
the “opportunity” to do so, if only they wanted, far more conveniently.  To
a large extent, some LLC managers can harm the corporation in multiple
ways, and simply not be held accountable.  For some fiduciaries, there is
free lunch—which is not free at all, but comes at the expense of those in
the position of most abject vulnerability.312  This deviation of enforceable
cial discretion in how the law is interpreted and applied.”); Smith, supra note 215
(analyzing equity from a modern law and economics perspective).
309. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Federal case law also supports an expan-
sive view of equity. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 119, at 709 n.41 (citing Supreme
Court cases to that effect).
310. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“This court shall have all the jurisdiction
and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery.”); Du Pont v.
Du Pont, 85 A.2d 724, 727–29 (Del. 1951) (“[T]he general equity jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery . . . is defined as all the general equity jurisdiction of the
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the
colonies . . . .  [The Delaware Constitution] intended to establish . . . a tribunal to
administer the remedies and principles of equity. . . .   Its result is to establish by
the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of the judiciary.
It secures for the protection of the people an adequate judicial system and
removes it from the vagaries of legislative whim.”); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (stating, four years after the passage of Dela-
ware’s new General Corporation Law, that “inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible”); In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114
A.3d 592, 603–05 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“I cannot accept the contention that . . . LLCs
. . . fall outside the domain of equity. . . .  [W]hen . . . an entity [has] attributes that
contracting parties cannot grant themselves by agreement, the entity is not purely
contractual.”); Johnson, supra note 119, at 702 (“The argument made here . . .
contends that the Delaware General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited from
preventing the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery from applying fiduciary
duties as those judges think best—whether or not a private agreement purports to
eliminate such duties.”).
311. Licht, supra note 302, at 179.
312. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 223 (“What precisely does it mean
for a director to have no duty of loyalty whatsoever to shareholders or to the corpo-
ration?  Taken literally, it would suggest that directors could simply gamble away
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law from actual law (including equity) is not even economically
efficient.313
In summary, certain areas of U.S. corporate law—which, in the sub-
stantive sense of the word, includes alternative corporations, such as
LLCs—are now in a state similar to the late Middle Ages in England, as we
find in Maitland’s vivid tale of the development of equity.314  It is unlikely
that human nature is about to change;315 corporate fiduciary law is an
inherent, unwaivable part of the structure governing all corporations,
however flexible they might otherwise be.
CONCLUSION
Participants in the corporate law community—judges, lawyers, busi-
nesspeople, scholars, and many others—grapple with a set of recurring
questions.  The ones about which corporate jurists think most often are
those pertaining to modifiable, dynamic choices: “should multiple-class
shares be permitted?” and “does a staggered board promote or weaken
managers’ compliance with their duties?” are common examples.  At a
more fundamental, structural level, the questions are “what is a corpora-
tion?” and “what is the corporation’s purpose?”  As this Article suggests,
the most overarching question might be: “what is corporate law?”
As to the latter, modern scholars mainly attempt to frame corporate
law in terms of other concepts or legal fields.  The best example, of course,
is the proclamation that corporate law is contract law, hallmark of the law
and economics movement and its “nexus of contracts” theory.  Others
have countered by stating that corporate law “is property law, not contract
law.”316  What all of these scholars have failed to consider is one possibil-
ity: corporate law is corporate law.  Its unique structure, presenting its own
set of practical issues, doctrines, and actors (“corporation,” “shareholder,”
the corporation’s money, or use corporate property to advance the director’s pri-
vate business interests.  Absent a duty of loyalty, charlatans could abuse the corpo-
rate form . . . .”).
313. See id. (“[W]hile the law may nominally permit waivers of the duty of
loyalty . . . , the courts are likely to intervene through other doctrines . . . .  [T]his
. . . would create substantial legal uncertainty in the interim, which, as we are so
often told, is bad for business.”).
314. F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW
4–6 (1909) (“Very often the petitioner . . . complains that for some reason or
another he can not get a remedy in the ordinary course of justice and yet he is
entitled to a remedy.  He is poor, . . . his adversary is rich and powerful, . . . or has
by some trick or some accident acquired an advantage of which the ordinary courts
with their formal procedure will not deprive him. . . . [O]wing to one thing and
another such wrongs are not always redressed by courts of law.”).
315. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy,
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty . . . .”).
316. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 440.
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“director”), is capable of generating highly beneficial economic and social
outcomes, not achievable through any other framework.
This Article provides a first-of-its-kind, nuanced, and fully self-explan-
atory account of corporate law’s structure and normative underpinnings.
Corporate law brings to the table at least two concepts we find in no other
field: the first, discussed in Section I.A above, is corporate purpose.  Every
corporation exists in order to achieve a certain purpose, which might be
the lawful pursuit of profit, or any other, such as those of nonprofit corpo-
rations.  The second concept, discussed in Section I.B above, is corporate
personhood.  Every corporation is a legal person, bearing its own rights, du-
ties, identity, and characteristics, separate from any other entity, and (with
few exceptions) possessing the same legal capacity as a natural person.
These two concepts, in turn, necessarily give rise to three additional
groups of actors: stakeholders, residual claimants, and fiduciaries.  As Sec-
tion I.C above describes, stakeholders, or non-residual claimants, enjoy a
superior normative framework upon which their claims rest: general, non-
corporate law.  Thanks to its inherently higher information content, general
law provides far more specific and easily enforceable imperatives than cor-
porate law, with its wide-open command to the corporation: “do whatever
(to achieve your purpose).”  Therefore, “corporate social responsibility”
advocates should seek reform in general, not corporate, law.  The corpora-
tion, like any other person, is required to meet all obligations under posi-
tive law.  It cannot be subject to legal sanction for lawful behavior, even
when some might view that behavior as subjectively undesirable.
Residual claimants (often known as “shareholders”), discussed in Sec-
tion I.D above, in fact have the opposite of “primacy”: their legal claim is
fully a product of corporate law, and is completely subordinated to all
stakeholders’ claims.  While residual claimants do not “own” the corpora-
tion or its assets, and are not directly owed duties by its fiduciaries, their
unique situation makes their claims more than contractual.  Share law is
grounded in equity—no more, no less.
Those usually occupying the center stage of corporate law adjudica-
tion and scholarship—the corporation’s fiduciaries, discussed in Section
I.E above—do not owe direct duties either to shareholders or to stake-
holders.  Their duties run to the corporate person.  By necessity, due to
the extreme and unavoidable power and information asymmetries be-
tween the artificial person and its human representatives, the latter owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation—nothing short of that.  Fiduciaries are
duty-bound to act in order to make the corporation achieve its purpose.
Finally, Part II above discusses three high-currency topics pervading
today’s corporate law: shareholder activism, corporations’ constitutional
rights in light of the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions, and the rise
of LLCs and other alternative corporations.  In each case, the fundamen-
tal, unwaivable structure of corporate law provides a new, more well-
grounded viewpoint from which to examine these issues.
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As this Article proves, the present-day dichotomy of corporate law—
the great debate between shareholderists and stakeholderists, each seek-
ing to promote external values (economic and communitarian, respec-
tively) within corporate law itself—does not, in fact, cohere with either
positive law or normative analysis.  It is possible for a corporation to act for
profit without offending anyone else in any legally proscribed way.  If the
corporation does breach its obligations, positive law provides ample re-
sponses.  At the same time, the corporation—an entirely separate person,
with its own rights, duties, and traits—is not meant to operate “for” share-
holders, and is not obliged to follow their desires.  The rights shareholders
and stakeholders possess are gained through (corporate or non-corpo-
rate) law.
One early case, touching upon four of the five building blocks dis-
cussed in this Article, paints a remarkably precise diagram of corporate
law’s structure:
There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connexion, be-
tween the holders of shares . . . and the directors . . . .  The bank
is a corporation and body politic, having a separate existence as a
distinct person in law . . . .  The very purpose of incorporation is,
to create such legal and ideal person in law, distinct from all the
persons composing it, in order to avoid the extreme difficulty,
and perhaps . . . the utter impracticability, of such a number of
persons acting together in their individual capacities. . . . [T]he
directors are the appointees of the corporation, not of the indi-
viduals. . . . [Stockholders] are not the legal owners of the prop-
erty . . . .  Their rights and their powers are limited . . . .  They are
members of an organized body, and exercise such powers as the
organization of the institution gives them. . . . [O]nly after [the
corporation’s] debts were paid . . . the stockholders would be
entitled to receive any thing. . . . [S]hares . . . [are] a qualified
and equitable interest . . . .317
The one building block not discussed in Smith v. Hurd318 is that
around which all the others may be arranged: the corporation’s purpose.
Yet, there is no reason to suggest that the court saw the for-profit corpora-
tion’s purpose as altruistic; its remark on the corporation’s “debts” implies
that those obligations can be ascertained through positive law, and are not
an open-ended guess.  Furthermore, the court’s mention of shareholders’
“equitable” rights, in a decision which might otherwise seem critical of
them, points to the nuanced structure of corporate law, and the impor-
tance of being attentive to each of its elements.
More than 170 years have passed since Smith v. Hurd was decided, but
many members of the corporate law community still perpetuate the same
317. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384–86 (1847).
318. Id.
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misconceptions that opinion had elaborately rejected.  The structure of
corporate law allows us to achieve what would otherwise be “utterly im-
practicable.”  It is time to take corporate law seriously.
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